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LATIN AMERICA REPORT

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ENGLISH-SPEAKING ARGENTINES STRIVE TO HELP FALKLANDERS

PY141914 Buenos Aires HERALD in English 14 Apr 82 p 8

[Editorial: "A Fine Sentiment"]

[Text] An initiative by a group of members of the Argentine English-speaking community, regardless of whether it comes off or not, could very well be the finest sentiment to come out of the unfortunate current conflict between Argentina and Britain and may also represent a new light at the end of the tunnel for the inhabitants of the Malvinas Islands. While talk of negotiations and the avoidance of war both in Buenos Aires and London appears stalled, a different kind of diplomatic thought is going on beneath the surface. The thought itself does not have to do directly with the avoidance of armed conflict, but with the effect of that conflict on the people who will be caught in the middle when (or if) the shooting starts. These people are, of course, the inhabitants of the islands, the isolated little community whose members are known colloquially as the kelpers.

The initiative mentioned above is aimed at helping the kelpers understand what is happening and how to cope with it. The English-speaking Argentine residents involved in the plan hope to be permitted to serve as a sort of cultural bridge between the islanders and the rest of the world. The idea of the mission which the people in the group hope to form is not to try to convince the kelpers to take any political side in the Anglo-Argentine dispute, but instead to assure them that if what they fear is Argentine rule, their fears are unfounded and that, on the contrary, there is reason to believe that they might be better off under the Argentine flag than they ever have been before.

In dealing with the islanders, it should be taken into account that they are an insular people, that their ties with Britain are based on what they are familiar with (the history of their ancestors, the language and the Falkland Islands Company, to which many of them owe house and home) and certainly not because of any close direct links with Britain itself either socially or politically. The kelpers are, it should be stressed, islanders in the truest sense of the word. They live on some of the world's remotest islands. Their communications system, if operative, is far from extensive. Their contact before occupation by the Argentine armed forces was at best highly limited. They are thus bound to be highly suspicious of any stranger

and particularly of anyone who does not speak their language. It is only natural for them to feel at first that they will be unable to tolerate rule by any government which is not British. But if people from the mainland of the same descent and speaking their same language can make contact with them, their eventual return to normal life, this time under Argentine rule, will be made much easier. It is a matter of their seeing through contact with people of British descent from the mainland, that Argentina is a socially (if not so politically) tolerant community, where people from many different ethnic groups live and work, maintaining the customs and languages of their ancestors among friends and family, while nurturing Argentine nationalism and feeling deeply Argentine on a broader international plane. Such a mission to the islands would not only be a service in the cause of understanding between Argentines and islanders, but could also lead to the raising of kelpers' voices against the looming threat of war between Britain and this country.

CSO: 3020/98

'HERALD' CALLS ON GOVERNMENT TO END BOYCOTT

PY140310 Buenos Aires HERALD in English 13 Apr 82 p 8

[Editorial: "Squeeze-Play Continues"]

[Text] The attack on the HERALD continues unabated and there seems to be little chance for an end to the ban on distribution of the paper imposed by the Association of Newspaper and Magazine Distributors [SEGBA] unless the government sees fit to intervene, as it should very well be able to do. In seeking recourse on the distribution ban, the HERALD has gone to the Public Information Secretariat to ask its help in overcoming the problem, but despite promises of aid in as far as possible, HERALD readers are still being forced to come to our offices to buy their daily paper or to receive it by subscription through the mail. Some newsvendors were bold enough to come to our offices themselves to pick up enough HERALDS to cover the demands of their regular customers. Other kiosks were receiving the paper through makeshift channels which were set up as an emergency measure until something could be done to return distribution to normal, but many of these vendors have since backtracked because of "suggestions" made to them by unidentified men who reportedly visited their stands. Meanwhile HERALD personnel who had voluntarily taken up the task of distributing some of the papers were very obviously followed on their rounds by a mysterious truck which inhibited delivery by its mere presence.

In a new step to seek the aid of the government in its role as the protector of the rights of the people, the HERALD has gone beyond the Public Information Secretariat and formally requested a meeting with Interior Minister Alfredo Saint Jean. In the letter to General Saint Jean, everything described above has been related in detail. Due to the gravity of the situation and the implied threat involved in distributing the newspaper, the HERALD has called on the Interior Ministry to grant it police protection for volunteer personnel temporarily involved in distribution activities. And at the same time, the HERALD takes the opportunity in the letter to inform the general of the reiterated threats against HERALD editor, James Neilson and his family.

It is difficult to believe that it is not within the power of the government-- a military government which rules with a state of siege decree in force-- to bring a halt to this arbitrary action against an organ of the free

Argentine press, particularly when this action signifies the capricious damaging of a going concern's economic standing, the mindless endangering of the source of work of 100 families, the blocking of free trade, the shackling of freedom of the press and the staining of the image of Argentina as an open, free society. Were there other companies one could go to for distribution the strike action would not be of such great importance, but the fact is that the distributors operate within a monopoly, and while this is by no means an accusation on the part of the newspaper but rather an observation of human reactions, it is interesting to note that vendors appear visibly shaken and frightened at the thought of accepting newspapers from the hands of anyone who does not represent the Association of Newspaper and Magazine Distributors. In their own 30 June 1981 annual report, the distributors refer to their activity as constituting "the carrying out of an important public service." And in the monopolistic form their business takes, the distributors' task may be taken as a public service. This means that their refusal to deliver because of differences with the editorial line of a paper is not far different from SEGBA not providing the HERALD with light for similar reasons. The latter case is unthinkable and so should the former be. The government must act to end this kind of abuse.

CSO: 3020/98

DIPLOMATIC SOURCES QUOTED: REAGAN WORRIED ABOUT LOSING ALLY

PY141859 Buenos Aires HERALD in English 14 Apr 82 p 9

[Text] "The survival of the British Conservative Government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher" has become "a priority" for U.S. President Ronald Reagan in the crisis surrounding the Malvinas Islands diplomatic sources said here yesterday.

The sources also said that according to reliable reports Reagan has refused to even consider a possible "replacement" of Mrs Thatcher by another Conservative leader--probably former Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington.

"President Reagan is extremely worried about the possibility of losing his only unyielding ally in Europe," the sources said. He is "also literally obsessed by an eventual British military showdown, if there is room for one," and the British Navy is a key security factor in the north Atlantic.

The conflict is causing Reagan many problems both domestically and abroad, the sources went on to say. "There has been in the United States a real avalanche of editorials and articles in the main newspapers reminding their readers of the human rights record of the Argentine Government."

Referring to the possible options open to Reagan in case of Mrs Thatcher's defeat, the sources said that "any government replacing her will have the same historical obligation to attempt to recovery of the islands, but--be it Conservative or Labor--it would be far less prone to supporting a U.S. administration that has deserted them."

To conclude, the sources said Reagan has not yet recovered from the effect of his failure to persuade Galtieri not to begin military operations on the islands during a 50-minute telephone conversation both presidents held late on 1 April, the eve of the Argentine forces' landing on the Malvinas.

CSO: 3020/98

LIKELIHOOD OF CONFLICT WITH UK VIEWED

PY092008 Buenos Aires HERALD in English 9 Apr 82 p 8

[Editorial: "Peace Is Possible, But..."]

[Text] There are times when intransigence, a refusal to budge an inch from a position that has been taken, is a very fine thing and deserving of admiration. But these are also times, like today, when excessive intransigence is little more than self-indulgent folly that deserves nothing but contempt. Unless the Argentine and British Governments begin to appreciate this in the next few days, however, there is every possibility that the two nations, both of which are members of the Western community, will start doing their utmost to destroy one another. Foreign Minister Nicanor Costa Mendez is, we hope, completely right in his stated belief that the danger of war between Argentina and Great Britain is fading. But we would be rather more convinced of this if there were positive signs that the leaders of the two nations were making a serious reappraisal of the situation into which they have got themselves. Unfortunately there are none. The British Armada continues on its course. A "maritime zone of exclusion"--in other words a blockade--has been thrown around the islands at the centre of the dispute by the British. The Argentine Government has preferred to describe the same area as a "theatre of operations." And from London have come extremely belligerent noises reflecting the British Government's proclaimed refusal ever to "appease dictators," a transparent reference to the unsuccessful British attempt to appease Mussolini and Hitler before the Second World War.

The atmosphere, then, is scarcely propitious for reasonable discussions in search of a mutually satisfactory arrangement--if indeed one is now possible--between the two sides. Or, to put it another way, the combined intellectual resources of the Argentine and British Governments have proven inadequate to the task of preventing part of their armed forces from hurling themselves at one another's throats. Both have contrived to get themselves into a situation in which they are faced with an appalling choice between waging war or accepting a humiliation they would regard as intolerable and which would, perhaps, end in their downfall.

Contributing greatly to the present tragedy is the weakness of both the British and the Argentine Governments. Mrs Margaret Thatcher's government has for years been striving to change the British economy in ways that may

be necessary but are nonetheless extremely painful and this has made her vulnerable to attacks from her critics. General Leopoldo Galtieri's government was, until the take-over of the south Atlantic islands, even more hard-pressed. Were the two countries both ruled by really strong governments confident in their ability to carry public opinion with them even when making unpopular decisions the chances of a negotiated settlement that would save Argentine and British face would be much greater than they are now. But while strong governments can make the kind of concessions both sides must make if they wish to avoid war, weak governments, uncomfortably aware that if they show too many signs of wavering they will fall, cannot do this. Therefore, there seems to be little to stop Argentina and Great Britain blundering into a war that a month ago would have seemed like an exercise in political fantasy, unless, of course, United States Secretary of State Alexander Haig and his many advisors have something more impressive in their briefcases than a mere desire to be helpful. The approaching tragedy, of course, could be averted. But then most of the many other tragedies that have afflicted mankind throughout his bloody history could have been averted if the muted voice of reason had not been drowned out by the savage but thrilling sound of war.

CSO: 3020/98

SOUTHWEST ATLANTIC VIEWED AS HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT

Buenos Aires LA NACION in Spanish 2 Apr 82 p 9

[Article by Jose S. Campobassi]

[Text] The Atlantic Ocean is a vast extension of water, covering more than 106 million square kilometers, which separates the Americas from Europe and Africa. From north to south, it goes from the Arctic Circle ($66^{\circ}30'$ latitude north) to the Antarctic Circle ($66^{\circ}30'$ latitude south). To the north it meets the Arctic Glacial Sea, and to the south, the Antarctic Glacial Sea. In the north as well as the south, it bathes the coasts of important lands: in the boreal region, the southernmost tip of Greenland and all of Iceland; in the south, the northern edge of Antarctica or the Antarctic continent and its northern islands.

Within the Atlantic Ocean, the North and South Atlantic are separated by the equator (0° latitude north and south). Its western border, which separates it in the south from the Pacific, is the meridian that passes through Cape Horn ($67^{\circ}16'20''$ longitude west of Greenwich), the southern tip of South America. Its eastern edge, which borders on the Indian Ocean, is the meridian which passes through Cape Agulhas (20° longitude east of Greenwich), the southern tip of the African continent.

Southwest Atlantic: Argentine Sea

From many standpoints, Argentina has interests in the South Atlantic. Its western waters lap the shores of northern Brazil, from the mouth of the Amazon River to Cape San Roque, in the northeast corner of Brazil. All of the eastern coasts of that nation, as well as those of Uruguay and Argentina, whether continental or insular, touch on the Atlantic, down to Cape Horn. On the eastern edge, the waters of the Atlantic bathe the southwestern shores of Africa, both continental and insular, from the equator to the so-called South African promontory.

But we Argentines are interested much more in a part of the South Atlantic which we call the Southwest Atlantic. It lies between the meridian of Cape Horn to the west; the Antarctic Circle to the south; the meridian 20° longitude west of Greenwich to the east; and parallel 40° latitude south, to the north. Within this maritime space lie the Argentine Sea, off the coast

of Patagonia; our part of the Tierra del Fuego Archipelago, from the Strait of Magellan to Cape Horn; the Malvinas islands; all the islands that make up the so-called Southern Antilles; the northern peninsular peaks of Argentine Antarctica; and the islands of those places. It is clearly and undeniably an Argentine sea all over.

All the islands of this region are of little or no economic value, except, with certain reservations, for the Argentine portion of the large island of Tierra del Fuego, the Malvinas and the northern Antarctic peninsular peaks. But those who wish to own them, whether or not they are our neighbors, know that the Southwest Atlantic is one of the richest and most important seas of the world. It also allows its possessors to project toward and over the Argentine Antarctic, and the islands of that sea have a projection over the waters of 370 kilometers from their coasts and in the corresponding directions, which means that each of them is the center of a circle more than 740 kilometers in diameter.

Great Wealth of Southwest Atlantic

What is there in the Southwest Atlantic? In the first place, let us mention oil and fish.

According to research and studies, there is an ocean of petroleum in the subsoil of that sea.

When I went on a journalistic mission to Patagonia, officials of the two most important oil companies in the world told me this. Now the reports are more precise: there are 32 billion cubic meters in basins less than 200 meters deep, and another similar amount in those more than 200 meters down. That means 64 billion cubic meters in a world whose annual consumption is 3.5 billion cubic meters. We must add the immense sources of natural gas associated with these oil deposits. These products are not easy to obtain; huge, technologically superior equipment is required, and exploration and exploitation are several times more expensive than on land.

The southwest Atlantic has extraordinary and varied fish resources. On a journalistic mission to Patagonia, I was told that Japanese research and studies reveal that this sea yields 14,000 kilograms of fish, while any other maritime region of the world would yield only 7,000 kilograms. At this time it is estimated that the Southwest Atlantic can produce 3 million tons of fish products a year. Special ocean-going vessels are required for this, not the simple, picturesque, flimsy boats that operate offshore.

Until recently, there were many whales in the Southwest Atlantic. Intensive depredation by the Russians has led to the near extinction of this species. One of the whale's foods is krill (which means small fish in Norwegian), a small crustacean 1 to 2 centimeters long. It has a high food value, and its population has grown to astounding numbers. It is estimated that there are 6 billion tons of krill. It is already used as food in a dozen countries, prepared as fish sticks or preserved in small cans. In our country it is not yet used as a food.

There are also marine algae that can produce 500,000 tons of elements suitable for mass production each year. On the ocean floor there are nodules of manganese and copper of very high quality, as well as zinc, lead and other minerals. There are indications of large deposits of such elements.

All these data may be open to debate and correction, as they are updated every day. But the figures known will never be greater than the potential ones.

Importance of Drake's Passage

Moreover, in the near future the Southwest Atlantic will play a major role in international maritime traffic. The Panama Canal, now the only means of interoceanic communication in the center of the Americas, is excessively vulnerable in case of war. In addition, the canal cannot be used for maritime traffic that uses ships of 300,000 tons and more, for the transportation of oil and grains, the two key elements in contemporary human life. The narrow width of the canal and the series of locks along its 81-kilometer length to make up for the difference in levels of the two oceans, make it impracticable for those monstrous vessels. If we eliminate, then, the Panama Canal; the Arctic Glacial Sea for its innumerable geographic irregularities and the long reach of the Arctic ice fields; and the Magellan and Beagle passages because of their inconvenience for this type of navigation, the only recourse for oceanic intercommunication is Drake's Passage, which is a fundamental part of the Southwest Atlantic.

This maritime region, with major continental coasts and island territories, is indisputably Argentine. But Great Britain, Chile, the United States, Russia, Japan, Brazil, West Germany and other countries have their eyes on it. Thus, we must be fully aware of the significance of that sea, which is entirely ours for geographical, historical and juridical reasons, for the future of Argentina. Therefore, we should give it special attention, without making unnecessary concessions or backing down. Otherwise, we would be a timid, spineless, insipid and innocuous country. Let us give an appropriate response to this foreign effrontery, in defense of our rights. Thus, we will help make Argentina a great, rich, powerful and respected nation.

NOTE TAKEN OF NICARAGUAN THREAT

Bogota EL SIGLO in Spanish 20 Mar 82 p 5

[Letter to the editor by J. Pastor Rodriguez S., San Andres, Isla.: "The Military Bases"]

[Text] In its 12 March edition, EL SIGLO brought us two stories worthy of consideration. The first one is a sketch which shows us the military installations of Sandinist Nicaragua whose purpose, as we know, is not of a defensive nature, as they are trying to make the uninformed believe but rather of an imminently aggressive character. It is no secret to anybody anywhere in the world that the Russians are interested in taking possession of the San Andres and Providencia Islands to install their diabolical bases in that place which would enable them to attack the area of the Caribbean, from the north to the south, in other words, including Colombia, the gateway to all of South America.

The second message in effect is an early x-ray showing the dangers facing our good country if the Colombian Government and its leaders do not "get on the stick," as we say. The barbarism and the social and labor agitation which we are suffering from now is only the beginning of the end. It is the mission of Cuba to prepare the ground for Moscow's anarchy to establish its rule.

One can only wish that the Colombian people will manage to hear the bells tolling and close ranks in time around the Conservative Party, the only bulwark capable of stopping the effects of the devastating whirlwind. Sincerely yours.

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CSO: 3010/1324

SUPPORT FOR MILITARY COOPERATION WITH U.S.

Bogota EL TIEMPO in Spanish 19 Mar 82 p 5-A

[Letter to the editor by Heladio Lozano B., Bogota: "Military Bases in San Andres"]

[Text] Dear Editor:

The U.S. Secretary of State said that talks were underway with Colombia to get permission to use some of this country's military installations. The government quickly said that it would not permit this sort of thing. I believe that this question should be studied from the practical angle. According to all reports in the newspapers, Nicaragua has a considerable quantity of offensive weapons and war preparation superior to those of Colombia. We are thus not able successfully to confront it without foreign assistance. Because of that I believe that we should permit the United States to use our military installations in San Andres; in that way I believe we would put an end to the harassment which that country subjects us to frequently. Otherwise I think that we must get ready to lose those islands. I think that Colombia does not dare give this permission to the United States out of fear of protest from Nicaragua and Cuba. Do those countries care at all that we protest against what they are doing to us, for example, in training guerrillas?

Everybody should have as much as he needs, not what the others think he should have.

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CSO: 3010/1324

REAGAN HEMISPHERIC POLICY EXAMINED

Bogota EL SIGLO in Spanish 19 Mar 82 p 4

[Commentary by Juan Diego Jaramillo: "Through the Looking Glass: Reagan and the Monroe Doctrine"]

[Text] It is difficult to fail to remember in these times that President Monroe's message to his country's Congress, delivered on 2 December 1823, later on to become known as the "Monroe Doctrine," at the time had the main objective of responding to the imperial intentions of the Holy Alliance, inspired by Russia, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, stopping Russia's absurd territorial designs on the Pacific Ocean.

When we talk about a revival of the Monroe Doctrine today, in the rather non-specific form of the anticommunist position of the United States, we are in reality alluding, unconsciously, to that anti-Russian element in the original doctrine which however was not the permanent characteristic of an ill-fated doctrine. During distant times it served to keep away from the American scene all predominant powers at the moment, including France and Great Britain; it was finally manifested as a common expression of U.S. imperialism during the second half of the 19th century, a tendency which we Latin American peoples simplify in an ironic fashion, calling it "America for the North Americans."

The Monroe Doctrine however at no time in its entire history was completely in force in terms of its exclusivist points and that is not true at this time either. During the 50 years after its publication, the doctrine was refuted in fact by the presence, in America, of the Empire of Brazil, governed by the House of Braganza. Thereafter, during the following 20 years until the start of the century, the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty gave England and the United States equal rights to exercise their influence over the American Hemisphere. After the abrogation of this treaty, of course, Panama was lost and during the following years the Marines invaded the Dominican Republic and Central America. But the Dutch and French colonies in the Caribbean remained as testimony of Europe's prolonged disobedience of the definitive orders from the democracy to the north.

The Reagan Doctrine, which is supposed to resemble the old edict by President Monroe, at no time has the same scope. The United States is not trying to

prohibit Europe's political and ideological influence on American affairs but is simply trying to compete with it on equal terms. Nor is the United States trying to prohibit the establishment of new colonies in America since the Russians were allowed to capture Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada, while the Americans are holding on to Puerto Rico. The current United States proposal instead seeks to restrict the East-West conflict scenario to the borders of the Old Continent and Asia where the Soviets justifiably can claim national interests, whereas in the Caribbean--and along the border of Mexico--it is the interest of the United States that is in danger.

The only point of resemblance between the Reagan and Monroe Doctrines involves the establishment of a direct confrontation between democracy, as a system of liberty, and communism as a reactionary, totalitarian, and oppressive force. There are no differences between the despotism of the tsars and of the Politburo. And there is much similarity between the liberal and democratic commitment of John Quincy Adams and of Reagan.

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CSO: 3010/1324

COMMANDER PASTORA ARRIVES ON 'PERSONAL' BUSINESS

PA141940 Paris AFP in Spanish 0322 GMT 14 Apr 82

[Text] San Jose, 13 Apr (AFP)--Eden Pastora, the legendary "Commander Cero" and one of the most popular leaders of the revolution that deposed the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua in 1979, is in Costa Rica, where he wants to settle again, according to a local television newscast.

Pastora resigned suddenly in July 1981 from his positions as commander in chief of the Sandinist peoples militias and deputy defense minister and left Nicaragua. This caused the widely varying reports on his whereabouts and his position in the Nicaraguan process.

Nevertheless, according to the television Channel 7 newscast, Pastora has told several Costa Rican politicians with whom he has met in the last several days that he continues to support the Sandinist revolution, although he is critical of several aspects.

According to the report, Pastora met here with former President Jose Figueres and with Juan Jose Echeverria, public security minister of the present administration, among others.

Eden Pastora lived in Costa Rica for many years and was even naturalized. Several of his children were born in Costa Rica and are Costa Rican citizens. His family returned to live in Costa Rica at the end of last year.

Pastora arrived at Santamaria International Airport outside San Jose on a private flight from another Latin American country.

[Panama City ACAN in Spanish at 1533 GMT on 14 April adds that Pastora arrived in Costa Rica "aboard a private Mexican plane" and that he was "accompanied by five persons--three Nicaraguans, one Ecuadorean and one Panamanian. The Nicaraguans were identified by the authorities as Juan Moya, Pedro J. Lara and Emiliano Torres, while the others who came with Cero are Cesar Cedeno, from Ecuador, and Manuel Perez, from Panama.]

CSO: 3010/1332

BRIEFS

INFORMAL SUMMIT AT INAUGURATION--Twelve presidents of friendly nations will attend President Elect Luis Alberto Monge's inauguration. According to official sources, the presidents' meeting, which will take place on 8 May when the 12 special guests attend Monge's inauguration ceremony at the National Stadium, will be held on an informal basis, with no fixed agenda. The following presidents have confirmed that they will attend: Venezuelan President Luis Herrera Campins, Panamanian President Aristides Royo, Colombian President Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala, Dominican Republic President Antonio Guzman, Mexican President Jose Lopez Portillo and Honduran President Roberto Suazo Cordova. Other special guests at the 8 May inauguration will include Jamaican Prime Minister Edward Seaga and Belizean Prime Minister George Price, as well as Peruvian President Fernando Belaunde Terry and Ecuadorean President Oswaldo Hurtado. Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, the head of the Spanish Government, is also expected. At their meeting with President Elect Luis Alberto Monge, the presidents will analyze the Central American region's political, economic and social situations. [Text] [PA112017 San Jose Radio Reloj in Spanish 1330 GMT 11 Apr 82]

COMMANDER OF GUANACASTE REGION--Col Alvaro Sanchez Monestel, director of the public force, said today that Col Rafael Arteaga Jaramillo has been appointed commander of the entire Guanacaste region. The first commander of the northern command is Maj Jorge Vindas. However, Colonel Sanchez said that Arteaga Jaramillo has been appointed commander of the entire Guanacaste region. He will remain at this post until it is proven that everything is normal; that there are no armed individuals in the region and that no incursions are originating from Nicaragua into our territory. The director of the public force said that there was complete calm over holy week and that no suspicious individuals were found. There were no signs of camps or groups hostile to the Sandinists. [Text] [PA122000 San Jose Radio Reloj in Spanish 1730 GMT 12 Apr 82]

NEW WEEKLY--Effective today LA NACION will publish a weekly paper for Cartago Province. In addition to its daily issue, this enterprise has recently introduced on the market LA NACION INTERNACIONAL and ALAJUELA EN LA NACION. [PA121358 San Jose LA NACION in Spanish 25 Mar 82 p 8A]

IDB LOAN--Carlos Manuel Echeverria, deputy minister of planning and economic policy, yesterday announced that the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has granted \$29.2 million in loans for the country's agrarian development and to finance investment studies. The IDB also agreed to lend \$32 million to the Central American Bank of Economic Integration for the isthmus' electrical interconnection. The loans granted to Costa Rica will be divided as follows: \$11 million which will be cancelled in the year 2021 with a 9.25-percent annual interest rate and a 3-year grace period; \$13 million to be cancelled by the year 2017 with a 2-percent annual interest rate and a 10-year grace period; and \$5.2 million to be cancelled by the year 2007 with a 2-percent annual interest rate. [PA121358 San Jose LA NACION in Spanish 31 Mar 82 pp 1, 13]

MEXICAN OIL DRILLING EQUIPMENT--San Jose, 10 Apr (NOTIMEX)--Official sources reported today that President Rodrigo Carazo was in Puerto Limon today to receive the first shipment of Mexican machinery to be used in drilling for oil on Costa Rica's Atlantic coast. The Mexican Government supplied the drilling equipment to Costa Rica through PEMEX for two deep wells in the area of Baja Talamanca, where it is said that the chances of finding petroleum in commercial quantities are good. President Carazo said that the delivery of the first 560 tons of machinery is "a model of South-South cooperation which could be followed by the countries of the North in their technological and economic relations with poor countries." The president said that Mexico had made the oil drilling equipment available to Costa Rica at the expense of its own needs because "as a brother country it is aware that our future is linked to its own destiny." The rest of the equipment will arrive in Puerto Limon on Tuesday, official Costa Rican sources announced. [Text] [FL121623 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish 2140 GMT 10 Apr 82]

CSO: 3010/1332

CASTRO CONFIRMS INVOLVEMENT IN 1948 BOGOTA EVENTS

PA112023 Madrid EFE in Spanish 2342 GMT 9 Apr 82

[Text] Bogota, 9 Apr (EFE)--Cuban President Fidel Castro today confirmed that he actively participated in the events that rocked Bogota in 1948 but he denied that he was one of the organizers.

In an extensive report broadcast today by the Emisoras Caracol Network, Castro said he helped the rebels against the Colombian Government because he believed it was "a just struggle." The so-called "Bogotazo," the most important revolt in Colombia since its independence at the beginning of the 19th century, was precipitated by the assassination of Liberal Party leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, the most popular Colombian at that time. According to observers, it was almost certain that Gaitan would have been the man to replace Mariano Ospina Perez, of the Conservative Party, in the presidency.

According to Castro, who at that time was a 21-year-old law student, he was in Bogota to attend a "Latin American forum of university students" which was to coincide with a Panamerican Congress organized by the OAS.

The Cuban president told Radio Caracol that on 9 April he had an appointment to meet with Gaitan and that when he was getting ready to go to Gaitan's office in downtown Bogota, people were running everywhere announcing the assassination and calling for vengeance.

The leader of the Cuban revolution then gave a step-by-step report on his activities in support of the rebels and of the persecution that the Colombian intelligence service launched against him and other Cubans, believing that they organized the revolt.

Fidel Castro noted that in one central police station that joined the protesters, he secured a shotgun and a saber and with these he went through most of Bogota seeking support to organize the masses and keep everything from ending up "as a simple act of anarchy."

In one place he met the chief of the rebel police force, who made him his assistant. However, they were later separated and Castro ended up in another division where he remained for 2 days before seeking protection in his country's consulate and returning to Havana.

More than 3,000 persons died and several thousand were wounded during the "Bogotazo," which is still recalled earnestly. Many lost their property and were even forced out of their communities.

In his reminiscence, Fidel Castro notes that although he already knew something about Marxist philosophy, at that time he was no expert in it and he instead considered himself a critic of U.S. doctrine and of the Cuban Government.

Castro also told the Colombian radio station that his intense experience on 9 April influenced his life and his revolutionary activities, which since then have been more vigorous.

CSO: 3010/1358

DOOR OPEN TO INVESTMENT BY FOREIGNERS FIRMS

FL131615 Nassau THE TRIBUNE in English 8 Apr 82 p 2

[By Lionel Martin]

[Text] Havana, 7 Apr (CANA-REUTER)--For the first time in more than 20 years, Cuba has opened the door to investments by foreigners.

Under a little-publicised law promulgated in February by the Cuban Council of Ministers, state-owned enterprises have been authorised to "unite in economic associations with foreign interests inside the national territory."

The law allows joint Cuban-foreign companies to rent property and build new factories, tourist centres and other facilities in the country.

As one example, a Cuban official said: "The law will allow such ventures as non-Cuban owned fast-food chains to operate outlets in major tourist hotels in Cuba."

After Fidel Castro led the revolutionary takeover on January 1, 1959, Cuba progressively nationalised the entire economy, including extensive foreign investments held mainly by the United States.

The new law, decree-law 50, was described by a high Cuban official as "one of the most significant economic policy moves since Cuba became a socialist state in the early sixties."

"Cuba's desperate need for hard currency in view of its high foreign debt is the main motive for offering attractive conditions for foreign businessmen," one Western diplomat said.

The shortage of hard currency stems from low world prices for sugar, Cuba's main export, and the fact that huge amounts of Soviet aid come mainly in non-convertible communist currency.

Cuba is a member of the communist trading bloc, the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (COMECON).

The biggest potential source of foreign investment would be the U.S, where hundreds of thousands of Cuban exiles live and which previously held widespread interests in the sugar, tourist and other industries.

But Washington shows no sign of easing a trade embargo on Cuba maintained since 1961. President Reagan said recently that the embargo would be strengthened because, he alleged, Cuba was supporting international terrorism.

The law limits foreign investors to a 49 per cent share in joint Cuban-foreign companies, but it stipulates that in exceptional cases the executive committee of the Council of Ministers could authorise greater foreign participation.

A Cuban Chamber of Commerce brochure said joint enterprises will have total independence from the state and "absolute liberty to designate their boards of directors and managers, define production and sales plans, fix prices, export and import directly and select personnel."

Free transfer overseas of hard currency, dividends and profits is guaranteed under the law. Taxes paid to the Cuban Government will be limited to 30 per cent of the net annual profit of the enterprises.

Taxes on profits and import duties will normally have to be paid, although the state finance committee has the power to temporarily exempt joint ventures from paying them.

Under the law, joint enterprises have the right to bring foreign managerial and skilled personnel to Cuba."

The Cuban workforce will be hired through a specially-organised Cuban enterprise which will pay the workers. The companies will have to pay a social security tax amounting to 25 per cent of the income of their Cuban workers.

Cuban executives are to be paid the same salaries as their foreign counterparts.

CSO: 3010/99

U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA SINCE 1961 ANALYZED

Havana PRISMA LATINOAMERICANO in Spanish Feb 82 pp 34-40

[Article by Francisco Lopez Segrera: "A Position of Principles"]

[Text] The U.S. policy of nonrecognition of Cuba has been in effect for 21 years. Washington broke relations with Havana on 3 January 1961.

The successive failures of the Cuban policy of the different U.S. administrations--Democratic (Kennedy, Johnson, Carter) as well as Republican (Eisenhower, Nixon, Ford, Reagan)--are due to reluctance to accept an essential fact: in 1959, Cuba stopped being a U.S. neocolonial territory.

U.S. INVESTMENTS
(In millions of dollars)

<u>Sector</u>	<u>1929</u>	<u>1936</u>	<u>1940</u>	<u>1946</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1953</u>	<u>1958</u>
Agriculture	575	256	241	227	263	265	265
Oil	9	6	10	15	20	24	90
Mining	---	---	(a)	15	15	70	180
Manufacturing	45	27	(a)	40	54	58	80
Public Services	215	315	233	251	271	297	344
Trade	15	15	(a)	12	21	24	35
Others	60	38	76	8	13	18	7
Total	919	666	560	568	657	756	1,001

(a) No specific data in "U.S. Investments in the Latin American Economy."

SOURCE: U.S. Commerce Department

(This chart reflects the degree of dependence and underdevelopment of the U.S. neo-colonial model Cuba was subjected to through the Platt Amendment and the Trade Reciprocity Treaties.)

After the failure of military aggressions and the economic blockade, the United States continues to try to negotiate its "relations" with Cuba from a position of strength and not as an equal.

Aware of the successive errors and failures (result of underestimation of the Cuban people and their revolution) and the indestructible nature of the revolutionary process, Ronald Reagan's administration is now trying to pressure Cuba to abandon the principles that govern its foreign policy. It is using old and new, but always false, accusations.

The Foreign Policy Resolution of the First PCC [Communist Party of Cuba] Congress held in December 1975 stated: "Aware that its historic objectives coincide with those of all the peoples, Cuba, in carrying out its foreign policy, subordinates its interests to the interests of the victory of socialism and communism, the national liberation of peoples, the defeat of imperialism and the elimination of colonialism, neocolonialism and every form of exploitation and discrimination of men and peoples."

Concerning Cuban-U.S. relations, the resolution indicated: "Before the Cuban Government initiates official discussions with U.S. authorities on the problem of re-establishing relations between the two countries, it will be necessary for the United States, through its appropriate state organs, to eliminate the essential aspects of the economic blockade of Cuba that it still maintains."

Dwight D. Eisenhower (1959-1961)

When the Batista tyranny--supported by the United States--was defeated and the Cuban revolution reached power in January 1959, the Eisenhower government immediately began a propaganda campaign against Cuba (on the pretext of the execution of Batista war criminals). It was aware that it was a true revolution consistent with the postulates expressed by Fidel Castro in "La historia me absolvera" during his trial for the attack on Moncada Barracks in 1953.

The growing hostility was due to the democratic, nationalistic and anti-imperialist nature of the Cuban revolution which was expressed in measures like the seizure of the U.S. telephone company on 3 March 1959 and the Agrarian Reform Law on 17 March 1959.

The United States directed and organized an internal counterrevolution that had its social base in the landowners and the lumpen bourgeoisie. It also mobilized the OAS to attack Cuba from abroad. This support for the internal counterrevolution and the preparation and encouragement of aggression of every type from abroad are the two lines of a single policy that it has maintained toward the island from 1959 until today.

In an escalation of its policy of aggression, the Eisenhower administration broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba on 3 January 1961. The Bay of Pigs invasion was already being prepared.

In short, U.S. policy toward Cuba under the Eisenhower administration was characterized by: slander campaigns, aid to war criminals, support for the internal counterrevolution through the CIA, criminal acts of sabotage from blowing up the French merchant ship "La Coubre" to bombing sugar mills, constant violation of air and maritime space, blackmail against countries that traded with Cuba, use of the OAS for counterrevolutionary purposes, the economic blockade and preparations for a direct invasion.

John F. Kennedy (1961-1963)

Harry Truman's doctrine of "containment" of communism was a reflection of U.S. hegemony facing the USSR which was drained and devastated and Japan and Europe, destroyed by the war. The United States made itself "protector" of its capitalist allies and policeman of the revolutionary processes.

Eisenhower's doctrine of "massive retaliation" was the expression of U.S. nuclear superiority over the USSR which was threatened with a massive atomic attack, knowing that its response capability was limited.

Now, on the other hand, Kennedy's doctrine of "flexible response", continued by Lyndon Johnson, was an expression of the fact that the United States no longer had nuclear impunity. The policy would be to quash movements of national liberation--especially leftist ones and particularly those in the Latin American "backyard"--with special antiguerrilla forces: counterinsurgency.

Kennedy aimed at achieving "detente" with the socialist countries through a "bridge building" policy. In spite of renouncing nuclear confrontation, it tried to ideologically erode socialism and, through "counterinsurgency" which was later "perfected" by Johnson, repress the revolutionary movements in the Third World, encouraging "local wars."

In Latin America, after the failure of the "Pan-American Operation" supported by Eisenhower as an alternative to the Cuban revolution, Kennedy launched the "Alliance for Progress" as a new reformist option. At the same time, he continued to try to wipe out the revolutionary process through direct aggression (Bay of Pigs) and even attempted nuclear blackmail during the 1962 October Crisis.

In 1961 and 1962, Cuba faced the peak of Washington's anti-Cuban policy: the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961 and the military blockade of the island in October 1962.

Between the Bay of Pigs (first defeat of imperialism in America) and the October Crisis, the Kennedy administration reinforced the economic blockade, decreed a total embargo of Cuban-U.S. trade in February 1962, began "Operation Mongoose"--the second great project after the failure of Bay of Pigs to overthrow the revolutionary government by violent means with the CIA using subversive actions of every type --and expanded the anti-Cuban propaganda campaign through the "Peace Corps" and the mass media.

After the victory of the Cuban people at Bay of Pigs and facing imminent new U.S. aggression, Cuba--with the support of the USSR--took measures to guarantee the defense of the island. This led Kennedy to place the world on the verge of nuclear catastrophe.

Fidel Castro analyzed the way the crisis was solved at the First PCC Congress when he pointed out how the United States "was obliged to make the commitment not to invade Cuba."

After the October Crisis, the Kennedy administration discarded direct aggression but continued its hostility in all other aspects and continued the economic blockade. Nevertheless, in 1963 the option of a possible political compromise with Cuba began to emerge among the leaders of the Democratic Party. Cuba would be included within the "bridge building" policy which was followed with the socialist camp, replacing military aggression with attempted ideological subversion of the Cuban process to undermine the revolution from within. At the time this policy began to be discussed, Kennedy was assassinated.

In "Bay of Pigs," a book published in 1979, American author P. Wydon--definitely not a friend of the revolution--evaluated Kennedy's policy and the U.S. policy in general toward Cuba as follows:

"The creators of U.S. policy customarily underestimate the strength and the firmness of people who have committed the sin of not having been born in the United States."

Lyndon Johnson (1963-1969)

The Johnson government, different from the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, saw its possibilities for direct military aggression against Cuba limited by four main factors:

1) The consolidation of the revolution; 2) the U.S. genocide against Vietnam channeling most of U.S. military power toward that country; 3) the commitment made in the 1962 October Crisis not to militarily attack Cuba; and 4) the increase in international solidarity.

In spite of these limitations that prevented a direct, large-scale assault against Cuba, the United States did not stop attacking the Cuban revolution whenever possible.

Richard Nixon (1969-1974) and Gerald Ford (1974-1976)

The Nixon-Ford administrations that had Kissinger as theoretician and executor of foreign policy sought "detente" with the USSR aware, as Kissinger stated, that the United States was in an "age of limits" (that is, limits to its power due to the change in the balance of power and U.S.-USSR nuclear parity). It had to seek new agreements for political and commercial ties with the USSR (linkages) that neutralized and/or paralyzed its aid to the movements of national liberation. Its five-sided strategy (modern imitation of Metternich) opposed the inadequate bipolar concept. This strategy was based on trying to create American peace based on agreements and negotiations between five poles of power (United States, USSR, Western Europe, Japan and China), ignoring the Third World.

Between 1969 and 1971, the Nixon administration drew up new plans with the counterrevolutionaries in exile in order to increase subversive activities to force Cuba to allocate resources toward defense, deflecting them from economic construction.

Nixon's personal and political ties with the Cuban counterrevolution that operated in the United States were one more ingredient to stimulate these aggressive plans.

The new international and regional situation, the strengthening of the international positions of the Cuban revolution and the continuing consolidation of socialist construction internally meant that, from the beginning of the decade of the 70's, a growing sector of U.S. government circles became aware of the fact that the policy toward Cuba had been a failure. Some began to state that the United States must cease in its unsuccessful attempts to isolate the island and others suggested limited and cautious contacts with Cuba.

This critical awareness of Washington's policy toward Cuba was due to several things:

1. The complete failure of the policy of aggression and blockade against Cuba was obvious.
2. The attempts to economically destroy Cuba had not yielded results. With the aid of socialist countries, especially the USSR, the Caribbean country received the raw materials and equipment necessary for its development. Havana also established solid commercial ties with capitalist countries like Spain, Canada, France, Sweden, the FRG and Japan.
3. The idea that the policy of nonrecognition had deprived the United States of the possibility to "influence" Cuba was gaining strength in U.S. political circles. Even those who rejected the reestablishment of capitalism on the island were leaning toward the idea of normalization of relations to try to undermine the revolution from within, given the complete failure of the policy of aggression, blockade and isolation.

The conditions for the reestablishment of contacts between Cuba and the United States through official channels were presented during Gerald Ford's administration although they had emerged before. The failure of Richard Nixon's anti-Cuban policy and the total discredit after the Watergate scandal contributed to this.

Another factor that contributed to revision of that policy was the pressure of powerful economic and political interests for whom the blockade and the open hostility toward Cuba were inadequate in their idea of the development of U.S. foreign policy. This came out in pronouncements by prestigious U.S. academicians and businessmen and in the Linowitz Report I in October 1974 which stated:

"The commission does not feel that continuation of the policy of isolation of Cuba significantly advances U.S. interests. Politically, the United States risks becoming the isolated country as country after country in Latin America reestablishes relations with Cuba."

This statement was presented in the framework of a growing number of Latin American countries that agreed about the need to consider the "Cuban case" as part of the "new dialogue" between the United States and Latin America. Kissinger proclaimed this tactically due to the rise of nationalist movements in the region.

Let us now look at the concrete steps taken in Cuban-U.S. relations during Gerald Ford's administration.

In 1973, the first bilateral agreement on airplane hijacking was signed and there was limited development in trade and sports contacts. After the failure of the "new dialogue," the 16th OAS Advisory Conference of Ministers of Foreign Relations held in July 1975 left the countries free to reestablish relations with Cuba. (As of that date, nine countries had already made that decision sovereignly, thus violating the previous OAS agreements.)

In 1975, a report by a group of U.S. congressmen ("On detente with Cuba") based on data obtained from a trip to the island by Senators J. Javits and C. Pell was published. Later Senator George McGovern visited. All this helped attenuate Washington's aggressiveness toward Cuba to some degree.

In August 1975, Washington lifted the ban on exporting products from foreign branches of U.S. companies to Cuba.

In March 1977, according to Gallup polls, only 32 percent of Americans was opposed to reestablishing relations with Cuba.

Nevertheless, due to the demands of the 1976 electoral campaign, the Ford administration stopped its steps toward rapprochement and began to question Cuba's solidarity with the people of Puerto Rico and to demand that Cuban internationalist troops be withdrawn from Angola as requirements leading to a bilateral agreement.

In October 1976, encouraged by the anti-Cuban campaign unleashed by Washington, the counterrevolutionary terrorist groups organized and trained by the CIA criminally sabotaged a Cuban civilian airplane in flight. Known as the "Crime of the Barbados," 73 people died. This made the Cuban Government denounce the Air and Maritime Piracy Agreement signed in 1973.

However, the trend toward an opening with Cuba emerged again at the end of the electoral process. In November 1976, after losing the election, Gerald Ford gave permission for airplanes of the Cuban Aviation Enterprise to fly over U.S. territory and suspended spy flights over Cuba.

Jimmy Carter (1977-1981)

Jimmy Carter's administration developed its policy toward Cuba guided, to a great extent, by the Linowitz Reports I (October 1974) and II (December 1976), particularly the latter.

A month before the Carter administration took office in January 1977, the Linowitz Report II indicated that "the new administration should seek ways to reopen a gradual and reciprocal process of normalization with Cuba."

These reports reflect Washington's perception that the Cuban process was consolidated. The Cuban economy had gone from capitalist dependency on U.S. monopolies to socialism. Cuban achievements in education, health, sports and other fields

were known throughout the world. Cuba had relations with more than 90 countries and had been chosen as the site of the Sixth Summit of Nonaligned Countries.

The Carter administration's initial policy toward Cuba corresponded with the perception of large U.S. sectors that, after the failure of the aggressive policy of five administrations, it would be useful for U.S. interests to seek formulas that constructively solved the historic conflict between the two countries.

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance publicly recognized that the blockade policy had been incorrect and ineffective. Following this keynote, the main U.S. leaders announced that when the Carter administration came into office, it planned to change U.S. policy toward Cuba.

Washington suspended the flights of U.S. spy planes over Cuban territory and decided not to ratify the ban on U.S. citizens traveling to Cuba without prior authorization from the State Department (imposed during the Kennedy administration).

After a series of gestures and concrete actions by both sides (it is important to point out that the economic blockade was not lifted but maintained in order to negotiate from a position of strength), Interest Sections were established on 1 September 1977 in Washington and Havana.

Cuban political leaders publicly recognized that Carter was the first president in 18 years who was not committed to a policy of hostility toward Cuba.

Nevertheless, in the middle of 1978, stagnation could be observed in this process. In 1979 and 1980, the rightist direction that the Carter administration took due to inconsistencies in its policy, electoral reasons, etc., meant that the more reactionary sectors created different "crises" with Cuba, ending the policy of positive steps and gestures.

Examples of this are: the Shaba 2 "crisis" that tried to detract from and falsify Cuba's internationalist role in Africa; the "crisis" of the so-called Soviet combat brigade that tried to show a Soviet-Cuban "threat" to the United States due to MIG-23 airplanes in Cuba for the celebration of the Sixth Summit of the Movement of Nonaligned Countries in Havana; and the "crisis" caused when the United States encouraged the illegal departure of antisocial elements which led to the events at the Peruvian Embassy and the Interest Section and the subsequent massive departure of these people to the United States through the maritime bridge established in the Cuban port of Mariel with Cuban authorization.

Five months before the elections, Carter--affected by domestic problems due to the avalanche of antisocial elements and the wave of hijackings of U.S. airplanes by these elements who were disillusioned by the U.S. "paradise"--tried to reduce the climate of tension with Cuba which hurt him in the elections.

The president of the United States gave great importance to this "crisis" with Cuba, declaring that his defeat by Reagan was the result of the situation of the U.S. hostages in Iran, the U.S. economic crisis and the problem of the Cuban antisocial elements.

In short, Carter's policy toward Cuba after the first stage (1977-78) went to the traditional aggressive position in 1979 and 1980. The spy flights began again, there were naval maneuvers around Cuba, a joint military force for the Caribbean based in Florida was created, illegal departures from Cuba were encouraged and a massive campaign on "the refugees and dissidents" began.

At the Second PCC Congress in December 1980, Fidel Castro evaluated Carter's policy toward Cuba in the following terms:

"Carter unquestionably made some gestures toward Cuba...but finally the reactionary ideas of some of his advisers prevailed over the less aggressive trends in the State Department under Vance and Muskie and relations again became strained."

To summarize, the Carter policy adopted a more appropriate focus and tactical steps consistent with this policy after the failure of the aggression by previous administrations. However, he tried to achieve his strategic objective of negotiating the Cuban policy of principles (particularly internationalist solidarity) in exchange for economic benefits from the eventual lifting of the blockade and renewal of trade relations.

Ronald Reagan (1981)

Ronald Reagan's victory in the November 1980 elections surprised quite a few analysts. Independent of temporary matters that were decisive for the Republican triumph (Jimmy Carter's inability to resolve the hostage problem, high electoral absenteeism--only 26 percent of the electorate voted for Reagan--etc.), this victory was, to a large degree, an expression of support by the large corporations, the bourgeoisie and the middle classes for an electoral platform that promised to recapture the endangered U.S. hegemony.

The multinationals saw maximization of their profits and the subsequent achievement of growing investment and profit opportunities in certain countries increasingly endangered.

The middle classes, buffeted by inflation and the energy crisis, heard promises of not only keeping their standard of living from deteriorating but improving it.

Certain sectors of the "power elite" felt that Carter had ceded a lot in his foreign policy and that none of the major problems of U.S. society had been solved.

When the United States emerged as a hegemonic capitalist power after World War II, the doctrines of the different presidents had a certain consistency based on imperialist "logic."

They made adjustments and negotiations, seeking areas of agreement and spearheads (relations with China, Camp David Agreements) since the international balance of power--due to the rise of movements of national liberation, the international worker movement and the growing power of the socialist camp, particularly the USSR--was shifting against the United States. To balance this, Reagan tries to deny history and draw a sharp line between the United States and the USSR, promising recovery of the lost hegemony.

His foreign policy doctrine is based on the search for military superiority over the USSR to negotiate from a position of strength and advocates a fight against "international terrorism." It regresses 30 years to the time of the "cold war."

The native roots of the movements of liberation in Central America, due to imperialist exploitation, are denied. According to imperialist "logic," revolutions are not the result of social injustice but of Cuban-Soviet subversion.

In the concrete case of its policy toward Latin America, particularly toward Central America, the document that will guide it will no longer be the Linowitz Report II of 1976 (which presented areas of agreement and negotiation in Latin America, the repudiation of dictatorships and signing the canal agreements) but the report prepared in May 1980 by the Santa Fe Committee.

The authors of the Santa Fe Report, advocates of a "hard line," present the main thesis that Cuban aid to "leftist movements" in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala "have converted Central America into an area of great instability in the last 2 years. This offers Cuba and the USSR great opportunities with regard to Mexican oil and the Panama Canal." They advocate aggressive actions against Cuba.

In the implementation of Reagan's foreign policy, based on this report and orchestrated by the most rightist elements in his government, El Salvador is the "test case" where the ability of the United States to contain communism and "Cuban-Soviet subversion" in this hemisphere will be demonstrated. It will be the starting point to recover U.S. hegemony, providing evidence to permit them to negotiate with the USSR from a position of strength.

Alternatives

The Reagan administration has based its policy toward Cuba on the Santa Fe Report. It launched a great propaganda campaign against the Cuban revolution, pointing out "its policy of aggression" toward its fraternal countries in the Americas and its strengthened "unfortunate alliance with the USSR."

The report stated: "If the propaganda fails, a war of national liberation against Castro should be launched."

The theoreticians of Santa Fe continued: "The other alternative will be to encourage the Cubans to carry out a radical change in their foreign policy. It must be clearly established that if the Soviet-Cuban alliance ends, the United States will be generous and will help restore the ruined Cuban economy."

These two options are offered to Cuba by the Santa Fe theoreticians.

Let us summarize the Reagan policy toward Cuba.

Already on 28 January 1980, during the presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan told CBS that the United States had to blockade Cuba to counteract the "Soviet invasion" of Afghanistan. On 10 March, in Florida, he repeated his opposition to normalization of relations with Cuba.

The Republican Party electoral platform of 18 July 1980 stated that Carter remained indifferent while Cuba "trains, arms and aggressively supports the forces of confrontation and revolution."

During the presidential campaign, Reagan's main foreign policy advisers--Roger Fontaine, James Teberge, Pedro San Juan and Jeanne Kirkpatrick--revealed the need to apply an "intelligent" policy in negotiations with Cuba which, for them, consists of dialoguing from a position of strength.

On 8 November 1980, Fontaine indicated: "The government might be prepared to be generous in terms of a number of areas...whenever the Cubans put an end to their present relationship with the Soviet Union which is equivalent to a military alliance."

In addition, those advisers jointly stated that they considered Cuba an enemy of the United States and would treat it as such.

On 9 January 1981, in congressional hearings for his confirmation as secretary of state, Alexander Haig said that "it would be very difficult to try to improve relations with Cuba" due to the activities of that country in Africa, Nicaragua and El Salvador.

Before Ronald Reagan took office, Fidel Castro's report to the Second PCC Congress (17 December 1980) summarized the aggressive climate of the electoral campaign and repeated the Cuban position of principles:

"Reagan and his advisers have spoken of militarily blockading Cuba on any pretext, including--according to them--if the Soviet Union carried out an action in any other part of the world. This idea is repugnant and cynical. Cuba will be ready to defend itself against any military blockade or Yankee imperialist invasion!"

He concluded by saying:

"If there is an olive branch, we will not reject it. If hostility continues and there is aggression, we will respond energetically. Cuba understands that normal relations among all the countries in the world based on mutual respect, the recognition of the sovereign right of each one and nonintervention is an historic world need. Cuba feels that normalization of its relations with the United States would help the political climate in Latin America and the Caribbean and would contribute to world detente. Cuba is not opposed to resolving its historic conflict with the United States but no one must try to make Cuba change its position or compromise its principles. Cuba is and will continue being socialist. Cuba is and will continue being a friend to the Soviet Union and all socialist states. Cuba is and will continue being an internationalist country. Principles are not negotiable."

The Reagan administration took office in January 1981. The new government immediately began to implement aggressive measures against Cuba in accord with the statements made during the electoral campaign. These include:

1. A propaganda campaign with the objective of "proving" Cuba's alleged responsibility for the rise of revolution in Central America, particularly in El Salvador. On 30 January, Haig stated: "It is clear that the Cubans are seriously involved in El Salvador and we are discovering more and more proof of involvement in Nicaragua." Later, they published the "White Paper" that contained alleged documentary proof about Cuba's participation in El Salvador.
2. The new administration began to pressure different Latin American governments that have relations with Cuba to change or even end them. These pressures became public in the case of Panama which responded sovereignly and energetically.
3. The Reagan government took steps to boycott the Sixth UNCTAD meeting in Havana.
4. It opposed Cuba's presence at the North-South Summit Meeting held in Cancun.
5. It publicly considered the possibility of materially supporting Angolan counterrevolutionary groups and announced that the CIA would reconsider the use of Cuban counterrevolutionaries living in the United States in actions against Cuba, divulging the existence of training camps where native Cuban and Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries are trained together.
6. Spy flights using SR-71 airplanes continued.
7. On 23 September, the creation of "Radio Jose Marti" suggested in the Santa Fe Report was announced. According to Thomas Enders, assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, the objective of this station is "that the Cuban people know what is happening in their country."

Fidel Castro answered all these aggressions in his speech on 24 October, repeating Cuba's position of principles.

Tension in the relations between the two countries increased in October and the first weeks of November 1981. There was indecision among the strategists in Washington during the last weeks of November 1981 although their position in general--as Cuban vice president Carlos Rafael Rodriguez told the correspondent from the Soviet newspaper PRAVDA--continued to be very aggressive.

In conclusion, the essential problems that impede the development of serious negotiations between Cuba and the United States still existed at the end of 1981.

In accord with its historic position of principles, Cuba will not renounce its internationalist foreign policy nor its sovereign right as an independent nation to solve the Cuban-U.S. conflict as equals. This is contradicted by the U.S. acceptance of negotiations from a position of strength.

Cuba is prepared, as always, to confront and defeat new aggression of any type.

7717

CSO: 3010/1239

BRIEFS

NORWEGIAN PARLIAMENTARIANS VISIT--A delegation of Norwegian parliamentarians representing various parties, which is visiting Cuba on invitation issued by the National Assembly of the people's government, has met with Jose A. Fernandez de Cossio, vice chairman of the state committee for economic cooperation [position as heard]. The Norwegian delegation is made up of (?Estei Ohoi), of the Socialist Left Party, member of the parliament, secretary of the committee for consumption and management and member of the broad committee for foreign and constitutional affairs; (?Iquiel Bolin) of the Labor Party, vice chairman of the lower chamber and member of the committee for social affairs; (?Christian Fochs) of the Conservative Party, member of this party's executive board and of the committee for energy and industry of the parliament; and (?Othwhite) of the Christian People's Party, member of the parliament's executive board, chairman of the higher chamber, member of the committee for consumption and management, alternate member of the committee for control and of the broad committee for foreign and constitutional affairs. The meeting served to exchange opinions on economic and industrial cooperation and other affairs of common interest in these fields. [Text] [FL130300 Havana Domestic Service in Spanish 2230 GMT 12 Apr 82]

MELL ARRIVES IN SOFIA--Oscar Fernandez Mell, president of the People's Government Provincial Assembly in Havana City, yesterday arrived in Sofia, Bulgaria, on a working visit. At the Sofia airport, Fernandez Mell was welcomed by the mayor of the Bulgarian capital, Petur Mezhdurechki. During his first day of activities, Fernandez Mell toured various centers of cultural and architectural interest. [Text] [FL131639 Havana Domestic Television Service in Spanish 1310 GMT 13 Apr 82]

TERRITORIAL MILITIAS' TRAINING--Julio Camacho Aguilera, member of Cuba's Communist Party Politburo and first party secretary in Havana City Province, has chaired a meeting at the provincial party's main offices during which a report on the general state of and conditions for the territorial militia's training was read. Camacho Aguilera stressed the need for preparing the capital's men and women to fight against the enemy and added that the courage to fight must be accompanied by combat readiness in order to win and not be defeated. This city must never fall in the hands of the enemy. Its people must be capable of defending it and, to this end, the strength we have must be efficient, the political leader states. During the meeting, it was announced that the process of new registrations will be completed this year. Silvio Placencia, vice president of the People's Government Provincial Assembly, referred to the current situation of troop training. [Text] [FL131652 Havana Domestic Television Service in Spanish 1310 GMT 13 Apr 82]

MELL MEETS BULGARIAN LEADERS--Sofia--Andrey Lukanov, deputy chairman of Bulgaria's Council of Ministers, has met with Oscar Fernandez Mell, president of the People's Government Provincial Assembly in Havana City, with whom he examined various aspects of bilateral cooperation. Oscar Fernandez Mell also held talks with Chudomir Aleksandrov, first secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party in Sofia. [Text] [FL141422 Havana Domestic Television Service in Spanish 1351 GMT 14 Apr 82]

U.S. BOYCOTTS SPORTS EVENTS--Cuban Olympic Committee President Manuel Gonzalez Guerra has accused the United States of boycotting various international sports events held in Cuba. The president of the Cuban Olympic Committee charged that this last weekend several attempts were made to prevent the successful celebration of the fourth Caribbean invitational swim meet. Gonzalez Guerra said that people acting in bad faith will not mar the splendor of the 14th Central American and Caribbean Games--the world's oldest regional meet--which will be held in Cuba next August. [Text] [FL141120 Havana Domestic Service in Spanish 0000 GMT 14 Apr 82]

GRENADA TIES ANNIVERSARY COMMEMORATED--The first steps to establish ties between the peoples of Grenada and Cuba were taken more than 20 years ago at the time of the triumph of the Cuban revolution, Kendrick Radix, member of the New Jewel Movement Politburo and minister of industrial development and fisheries of Grenada, has asserted. The Grenadian leader made a speech at the commemoration of the third anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Cuba and Grenada, sponsored by the Cuban Institute of Friendship with the Peoples. Referring to the origin of the ties, the Grenadian leader stated that his generation had witnessed how much imperialism had done to subjugate the Cuban people and take away from them their final independence. [Text] [FL141247 Havana Domestic Television Service in Spanish 1210 GMT 14 Apr 82]

GHANAIAN DELEGATION VISIT--A Ghanaian delegation visiting our country led by Christ Bukari Atim, member of the Provisional National Defense Council and coordinator of the people's defense committees, has visited a local CDR [Committees for the Defense of the Revolution] to learn how they work. Accompanied by Alfonso Hodge, a member of the party's Central Committee and deputy coordinator of the CDR, the Ghanaian leader chatted with the members of CDR Five, Zone 49, in Cerro Municipality, Havana City Province. The coordinator of the Cerro Municipal CDR, Jenaro Fernandez, explained the methods used by the masses to fulfill the assigned tasks. Jaun Quiros, a member of the national CDR secretariat, and provincial coordinator, Jose Antonio Gell Noa, answered the Ghanaian leader's questions about the organization's structure. [Text] [FL141502 Havana Domestic Service in Spanish 1409 GMT 14 Apr 82]

HART, FERNANDEZ HEAD MEETING--Armando Hart Davalos, member of the Politburo and minister of culture, and Jose Ramon Fernandez, member of the Central Committee and minister of education, presided over the two ministries' joint advisory council meeting held this afternoon. The report summarizing those sent by each province was read and discussed by the organization members who attended the meeting. [FL141717 Havana Domestic Television Service in Spanish 0100 GMT 14 Apr 82]

MILIAN HEADS PROVINCIAL MEETING--Arnaldo Milian Castro, member of the party Politburo, said that Sancti Spiritus Province can meet this year's agricultural plans despite the adversities of nature, an achievement which would be good for the country. The minister of agriculture made that estimate at the closure of the plenary meeting with directors of enterprises and the provincial delegation of the agricultural organizations' advisory council which was held at the provincial committee's main offices in Sancti Spiritus. [FL150220 Havana Domestic Service in Spanish 0000 GMT 15 Apr 82]

NEW STANDING WORK COMMITTEES--Flavio Bravo, chairman of the People's Government National Assembly [ANPP], announced this afternoon the establishment of four new ANPP standing work committees, complying with one of the decisions of the ANPP session held last December. The committees are: culture, arts and recreation, headed by Ernesto Vera; education, science and sports, headed by Marta Rosa Rodriguez; youth, children and equality of rights for women, headed by Vilma Espin; and commerce, services, hotel, restaurants and tourism, headed by Rena Lara. Flavio Bravo told the deputies responsible for those tasks about the importance of having each committee's work well outlined and to work in close coordination with the organizations concerned with that field. [FL150220 Havana Domestic Service in Spanish 0000 GMT 15 Apr 82]

CSO: 3010/1352

DAILY COMMENTS ON PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO VENEZUELA, COLOMBIA

Quito EL COMERCIO in Spanish 22 Mar 82 p A5

[Text] President Osvaldo Hurtado's visit to Colombia begins today. Its purpose is to strengthen integrationist processes, especially the one regulated by the Santa Marta Accord. The visit is basically the result of the Ecuadoran Government's interest in achieving better understanding of third countries so as to find a fair and peaceful solution to the dispute stemming from the 1941-1942 conflict. In special statements, the ambassador to Colombia has said that the president will also deal with the growing influx of Colombians into Ecuador, a problem that must be examined in a special way. It has also been learned that President Hurtado will join with Colombian and Venezuelan leaders in looking at the vital energy problem which is of extraordinary importance under the current circumstances.

On this opportunity, we would like to express the opinion that President Hurtado's planned visits, in response to the invitations of the governments of Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela, had nothing objectionable and that, on the contrary, it could be highly useful in taking advantage of the internationalism of our times and particularly, inter-American relations. In no way must we remain isolated when international ties and repercussions are growing stronger. In addition, it would be absurd to believe that it is unsuitable to seek better understanding of third countries in favor of a peaceful solution to our dispute with Peru. From that standpoint and from the standpoint of economic problems, these presidential travels can be useful.

Yesterday, we spoke of the dramas and tragedies now occurring in a number of Latin American countries, which have turned into martyrs and the victims of certain political maneuvers resulting from foreign pressures. From the sight of such killing and destruction, we could deduce nothing but the need to seek every possible means to save our countries from self-destruction. The slogans of economic progress, political stability supporting democracy and social well-being must not be mere theoretical aspirations, but rather, processes of action. These objectives cannot be achieved solely through a domestic policy, but must have international cooperation and solidarity, which in turn must be pursued with special responsibility.

For these very reasons, nothing could be more fitting than a dialogue between leaders who are forced to plan a future full of peace and creative harmony

for our peoples. As is clearly visible, these and no others are the purposes of President Hurtado's visits to certain South American countries. We previously expressed our opinion when he went to Brazil and we now hold the same view when it is a question of visiting Venezuela and Colombia, nations with which our relations are especially cordial and promising and should be permanently strengthened.

The Ecuadoran president takes to Colombia and Venezuela the message of our people and our nation, which has the heroic role of loyalty with Bolivar's cause of freedom, unity and solidary purposes and goals. We hope that the spirit of that message will find a favorable echo in the hearts and minds of the Colombian and Venezuelan peoples.

11,464

CSO: 3010/1188

FARMERS' GROUP WANTS AGRICULTURE MINISTER'S RESIGNATION

Quito EL COMERCIO in Spanish 17 Mar 82 p 2A

[Text] Guayaquil, 16 Mar--During an assembly of the National Federation of Chambers of Agriculture of Ecuador held tonight, a request for the resignation of Minister of Agriculture Carlos Vallejo Lopez was repeated. The minister was labeled as incompetent, demagogic, arrogant and a dictator, "hiding behind the president of the republic, Dr Osvaldo Hurtado."

The pronouncement was made at a meeting held here by the Federation, a meeting presided over by Dr Hernan Chiriboga, who in turn is president of the Chamber of Agriculture of Zone I of Quito. Attending were representatives of the country's other chambers and delegates from the cacao sector.

The session began at 6:00 in the afternoon and lasted until late at night. Concrete resolutions will be passed "benefiting farmers all over Ecuador," it was stated.

The president of the Chamber of Zone II of Guayaquil, Carlos Zevallos Ampuero, analyzed the situation of farmers which, he said, "is due to the lack of attention on the part of the government."

He asked for support for the request formulated by the delegations from Manabi and El Oro for the resignation of the minister of agriculture, who was accused of being a demagogue and of trying to surprise the citizenry with his response that his resignation is being asked for because he does not make it rain and because he is not Saint Isidro. He said that the minister thinks he knows everything and hides behind the president of the republic.

He added that Minister Vallejo believes he is more of a dictator than the dictators the country has had and that he "makes a show of power."

For his part, the president of the Federation, Dr Hernan Chiriboga, stated that the meeting is not political and is not for the purpose of attacking the national government. He asked that "valid resolutions be taken in order for the president of the republic to take measures making it possible for farmers to have the same prospects and advantages as those in other sectors, to have a fair income and live under acceptable conditions."

He harshly criticized statements by the public sector to the effect that professionals in the academic field cannot be farmers. "It is not up to the ministers to say that those who are lawyers cannot be farmers," he said, asking "that they not say that pejorative phrases are not used for the farmer." He said that the official sector, on the other hand, believes that manufacturers can be merchants and vice versa, "but the farmer does not dare to be bold enough to enroll in the university and gain a profession." Dr Chiriboga is an attorney at the courts of justice.

"It is an honor for me to be an attorney, but that does not prevent me from being a farmer and a leader of the farm sector," he maintained, adding that "we are leaders because of the mandate of Ecuadoran farmers, who depend on our work." Finally, he said that the Federation must support the request for the resignation of the minister of agriculture, "not because he cannot make it rain, but rather, because of his inability to solve farm problems."

The representative of the cacao sector, Edmundo Sotomayor, said that by using sodium iodide, urea and other chemical products, it is possible to make it rain, as has already been done in Chongon and other areas.

He said that the minister is arrogant and repeated his support for Manabi and El Oro, which have come out for the resignation of the minister of agriculture.

11,464

CSO: 3010/1188

BRIEFS

PESSIMISM OVER OIL, ECONOMY--Little optimism in the immediate future of the country's economic situation, which is suffering the negative effects of the continuing drop in the price of oil and the government's intention of increasing the rationalized production of crude, without affecting existing oil reserves, was expressed by President Osvaldo Hurtado Larrea at an unscheduled press conference granted yesterday at the close of his visit to oil wells in the Amazon region. In his statements, Hurtado revealed a certain amount of pessimism over the coming months due to the current international economic circumstances, which are not at all encouraging. He said that Ecuador cannot duck this reality because of the fact that since the growth rate of the industrialized countries is so low, there is a reduction in the demand for raw materials and agricultural products. However, he announced that the government intends to increase production during the second half of the year by some 25,000 barrels of oil, in order to absorb the drop in the international price of crude. He stated that maximum production in 1982 -- excepting the 25,000 barrels -- will be 211,000 barrels, and it is assumed that by 1983, that figure will drop to 2,000 barrels a day. [By Patricio Carpio Mendieta] [Excerpt] [Quito EL TIEMPO in Spanish 13 Mar 82 p A1] 11,464

CSO: 3010/1188

BRIEFS

CALL FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTION--Msgr Arturo Rivera y Damas, archbishop of El Salvador, arrived last night in Panama from San Salvador to participate in the Fourth Bolivarian Eucharistic Congress. Monsignor Rivera y Damas told us he is pleased to be in this country, and expressed his feelings about the great brotherhood that exists in the area. The entire region is closely following the current events in El Salvador, where thousands of innocent people have died. According to Rivera y Damas, the current Salvadoran situation suggests the prospect of peace. He added that a unity government would bring together the necessary elements. If a solution is not reached and an extreme-right government is formed, the guerrillas would continue their activities indefinitely. We believe, Rivera y Damas added, that the changes sponsored by Jose Napoleon Duarte's government prove that there still is a desire for a calm and peaceful solution to the conflict, which for years has caused the shedding of innocent blood. [Text] [PA130147 Panama City Circuito RPC Television in Spanish 1715 GMT 12 Apr 82]

CSO: 3010/1331

EDITORIAL NOTES SUBVERSIVES' 'HOUR OF DECISION'

PA121956 Guatemala City DIARIO DE CENTRO AMERICA in Spanish 2 Apr 82 p 3

[Editorial: "Special Importance of the Government Junta's Call to Subversives to Lay Down Their Arms"]

[Text] When there is obvious incompatibility between the strict enforcement of a law and the sociopolitical situation of the moment; when it is advantageous for strict legal norms to yield to de facto situations in sacrifice to the common good; when, for high-level reasons of public convenience, it becomes necessary to give special treatment to those who have broken the law in areas related to order, security and institutionality, the required measures must be adopted and they constitute one aspect of basic high-level policy.

This is the typical case that presently exists in Guatemala, when a number of our compatriots have become entangled in the web of subversion.

In the area of subversion or insurgency, the Guatemalan situation has an angle that makes it different from the situation prevailing in other countries.

In our country, the Cuban-Soviet arm, which has been extended to Central America for high international strategic reasons, uses the following elements to win supporters and swell its ranks:

The low cultural level of a large portion of the Guatemalan population;

The dissatisfaction resulting from the economic and social conditions of underdevelopment; and

The ethnic tensions that remain, primarily between the Indian and Ladino sectors.

These conditions permit an operation of deceit that attracts into the subversive movement citizens who, on obtaining greater knowledge of what the movement entails, become disillusioned and wish to leave its ranks.

However, the subversives use terror to prevent the individuals from reflecting on their involuntary error and leaving the movement.

This picture reveals the broad underlying justification for the actions of the military government junta in its call for the subversive elements to lay down their weapons and to return to their normal activities in Guatemalan society.

The intrinsic importance of these actions has been rapidly noted by the country's major newspapers, such as the morning paper EL GRAFICO, which highlights the topic on its third page with a five-column headline and four photographs.

The subversive elements should keep in mind that this is an exceptionally beneficial opportunity for them, since the military government junta is invested with special executive and legislative powers.

The time has come for each of the citizens who has joined these groups for one reason or another to make a crucial decision.

For the subversives, the time has come to decide, to take a step forward and to join in the people's effort to reconstruct the country in united action by all social sectors.

CSO: 3010/1327

OFFICERS DISCUSS ANTIGUERRILLA STRATEGIES

PA140148 Guatemala City DIARIO DE CENTRO AMERICA in Spanish 2 Apr 82 p 3

[Text] Col Francisco Luis Gordillo Martinez, member of the military government junta and minister of communications and public works, made important remarks regarding the junta's intentions for all Guatemalans to live in peace. These remarks were obtained by DIARIO EL GRAFICO which published them today with photographs. One of the photos shows Colonel Gordillo Martinez being interviewed by newsman Ricardo Gatica Trejo.

Basically, Colonel Gordillo Martinez called on the guerrillas to lay down their arms and reintegrate themselves in society. This call is based on the junta's intention to find a peaceful coexistence among Guatemalans.

Colonel Gordillo Martinez explained that the army continues to struggle against subversion because subversion continues to cause unrest in the country. For this reason, the struggle against it has not ceased at any time and the army troops are fighting on all the fronts, wherever combat is necessary.

DIARIO EL GRAFICO also reports on a statement by Gen Egberto Horacio Maldonado Schaad, member of the junta and government minister. He said that the government is not only fighting against the guerrillas with weapons but civic-action plans which are being implemented to solve the problems of the communities.

Maldonado Schaad said that the army is carrying out operations that will permit the elimination of the sources of poverty and social discontent. "We will help in all areas of the daily lives of the communities and at the same time we will fight the guerrillas," he added.

The newspaper added that Col Jorge Mario Morales, commander of the Quezaltenango military base, said that the army has the entire situation under control. The areas that were under guerrilla control before have been recovered and many families have already returned to their homes.

It is evident, the commander said, that the guerrilla movement has greatly reduced its activities in the region because the military control has been effective.

He added that the civilian population no longer supports the guerrilla groups as it previously did. He noted that the army units are carrying out daily operations throughout the region.

The newspaper also reported a statement by Maj Arturo Sanchez, junta adviser, who said that certain plans for civil works are being implemented in Chimaltenango and that this will permit the definite eradication of the guerrilla activity which had become strong; it had converted itself in a team to wear down the army.

He said that military action will be implemented with civilian campaigns to reintegrate into society many people who sought possible aid through the guerrilla movement.

CSO: 3010/1327

JUNTA'S VIEW ON CUBA, NICARAGUA AMBIGUOUS

PA121425 Guatemala City PRENSA LIBRE in Spanish 3 Apr 82 p 2

["Current Events" column]

[Excerpts] Many Mexican and Guatemalan readers must be wondering about the statement to a Mexican newsman by the president of the Guatemalan Government junta. He said that "we can have geopolitical unity around the American Mediterranean, the Caribbean." Although this appears to be a carelessly stated phrase, it was the answer to a direct question about Guatemala's policy regarding Cuba and Nicaragua. In other words, it must be understood that this "geopolitical unity" involves those two countries and naturally, our own. It is a shame that the newsman did not ask for an expansion of this abstruse idea in order to understand the meaning of this geopolitical unity, its use and its practical consequences on the policy of those three countries and the rest of the Central American isthmus.

How can the "geopolitical unity" of the Caribbean that the president of the government junta mentioned to the Mexican reporter be understood if Cuba and Nicaragua are part of an expansionist operation in which our country is a previously announced victim? If geopolitics could be used in such conditions, it would have to be for defensive objectives and never--one does not even need to say it--with the enemy who we know plots to destroy our institutions. Such a situation could only occur if the pact were to service Soviet plans in the isthmus in accordance with the saying: "If you can't beat them, join them." This is something we are sure did not cross the mind of the president of the junta. How could it be so, if Guatemala has reiterated its adherence to democratic principles and the army is committed to defending the republican institutions and all they involve, something that has been the basis for recognition by the other free nation?

The newsman wanted to know whether the military government is planning to renew relations with Cuba and whether it plans to seek rapprochement with Nicaragua--that is, friendlier relations than have existed. The answer was left to subjective interpretation by each reader.

CSO: 3010/1327

BRIEFS

POLICE SECRETARY RESIGNS--Angel Maria Menendez Lemus resigned as secretary general of the National Police on 1 April, 7 days after he took office. The reasons for his resignation were not given. The director general of the National Police will soon announce his replacement. [PA131407 Guatemala City PRENSA LIBRE in Spanish 3 Apr 82 p 14]

GUERRILLA GROUPS STAGE ATTACKS--Commando groups of the National Revolutionary Unity of Guatemala on Monday attacked various installations of the regime in El Quiche Department. Reports from Central America stress that four members of paramilitary bands were killed and several were wounded in the actions. The guerrillas also attacked a police station in Santa Cruz, capital of El Quiche Department. They killed a policeman and seized many weapons and much ammunition. It has also been reported that the guerrillas intensely harassed the repressive forces in Santa Rosa Department, where they also attacked a police station. Meanwhile, Guatemalan paramilitary forces destroyed a village in Chimaltenango Department, where they killed 15 Indians and burned 175 huts. [Text] [PA141830 Havana International Service in Spanish 1600 CMT 14 Apr 82]

CSO: 3010/1327

MORE NICARAGUAN REFUGEES ARRIVE IN COUNTRY

PA141915 Tegucigalpa EL HERALDO in Spanish 13 Apr 82 p 2

[Excerpt] Twenty additional Nicaraguan families entered Honduran territory in the past few hours through the Cifuentes sector, on the border area of El Paraiso Department, according to Population and Immigration Director Manuel Suarez Benavides.

These new families join the nearly 100 refugees from that country who entered the country last week and who are now in Trojes, in the same department.

The official reported that the coordinator of the National Refugee Commission, Abraham Garcia Turcios, traveled to these cities yesterday to investigate the situation of these refugees and make a report for the government authorities.

He added that these Nicaraguan refugees will be transferred to camps that will be built in the next few days, some 50 km from the border.

The location for the new camp has not yet been decided, but the work should be started in the next few days, as the refugees are now staying in local schools.

Suarez Benavides also denied reports about the entry into the country of some 4,000 Guatemalans in the past few hours, asserting that he had no information at all concerning such reports. He said there are only some 570 Guatemalan refugees in the country at the present time.

CSO: 3010/1328

SANDINIST FORCES ALLEGEDLY ATTACK PUERTO LEMPIRA

PA141640 Tegucigalpa EL HERALDO in Spanish 13 Apr 82 p 2

[Text] Reports from Puerto Lempira describe a Sandinist attack on that Honduran community, killing several civilians.

The Public Security Forces (FUSEP) have no information concerning new clashes between Honduran and Nicaraguan groups in the sector.

The scant information received from Puerto Lempira indicates that several troops of the Sandinist People's Army attacked a group of Honduran civilians, killing and wounding an unspecified number.

The police public relations officer, Lt Carlos Quezada, said that difficult climatic conditions in the area and the lack of proper communications have considerably impaired all contact between Puerto Lempira and this capital.

"We have only received very limited radio reports, and we have not yet been able to obtain a detailed account of the incidents," Quezada said. He noted that they were waiting for the arrival of some of the scheduled airline or air force flights to learn more about the alleged incidents.

Quezada did not discard the possibility of a special air force mission to confirm or deny the unofficial reports circulating in Tegucigalpa.

CSO: 3010/1328

BRIEFS

AMBASSADOR TO JAPAN--Edgardo Sevilla Idiaquez has been appointed Honduran ambassador to Japan. This means that he will no longer be executive secretary of the Honduran Council of Private Enterprise. [PA121402 San Pedro SULA TIEMPO in Spanish 25 Mar 82 p 9]

NEW BATTALION--A ceremony was held at the headquarters of the 3d infantry battalion in San Pedro Sula yesterday afternoon to create the 9th infantry battalion. Col Gustavo Adolfo Alvarez Martinez, chief of the armed forces, delivered the command baton to Col Rigoberto Regalado Lara, who will head this new battalion. The 9th infantry battalion will have its headquarters in Comayagua and will protect the forgotten Mosquitia region. [PA121402 San Pedro SULA TIEMPO in Spanish 2 Apr 82 p 10-A]

NEW ANDI PRESIDENT--Rafael Pastor Zelaya was elected president of the National Industrialists Association [Asociacion Nacional de Industriales--ANDI] yesterday. In addition to Pastor Zelaya, the board of directors is made up of: Adolfo Facusse, vice-president; Leonel Z. Bendeck, secretary; Fernando Medina, Feisal Sikaffy, Dagoberto Hode and Daniel Kafatty, members; and Richard Zabla, Jorge Zavala Burgos, Victor M. Kawas, Johny Walter and Ricardo Maduro, alternate members. [PA121402 San Pedro SULA TIEMPO in Spanish 31 Mar 82 p 8]

NEW POLICE OFFICERS--Infantry Cols Herman Orestes Ponce Nitch and Ricardo Pinto Recinos took office yesterday as general director and deputy general director of the National Police Force. At the same ceremony, Maj Oscar Menendez Tobias was sworn in as chief of the traffic department. [PA131403 Guatemala City PRENSA LIBRE in Spanish 25 Mar 82 p 6]

CSO: 3010/1328

PRI GUBERNATORIAL CANDIDATE FOR CHIAPAS ON BORDER PROBLEMS

Mexico City PROCESO in Spanish 29 Mar 82 p 22

[Article by Candelaria Rodriguez Sosa: "After 30 Years a Military Man Will Govern Chiapas, He Denies That He Will Be Harsh"]

[Text] Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chiapas--After 30 years of civilian governors, a military man, Gen Absalon Castellanos Dominguez, will again (there is nothing to indicate the contrary) be occupying the Chiapas government residence.

From 1830, when Gen Joaquin Miguel Gutierrez was governor, until 1914, when the institutionalized revolution arrived in Chiapas, the post was held by 14 members of the military, including generals and colonels. Years later, the government of the center sent Gen Agustin Castro as provisional governor, and, subsequently, two others to assume the same position.

The PRI [Institutional Revolutionary Party] candidate to succeed Governor Juan Sabines declares:

"The national sovereignty will be protected in Chiapas, not only in this state but in any part of the country. The Armed Forces are under the command of their born leader, the president of the republic, in the event of emergency and on behalf of the national interest."

Regarding the claim made by the governor of Chiapas ("the Guatemalan Army has mistreated Mexican Indians in the border zone"), Castellanos Dominguez commented: "It is a problem that is incumbent on the federal government. Governor Sabines acted properly, by reporting to the central authorities what had been reported to him in this connection."

He was asked: "General, as a native of Chiapas, as a Mexican, as a military man, as a candidate of the party in power and as a possible future governor, what do you think about this matter?"

He replied: "The federal government has all the facilities necessary to resolve any situation that may arise on the international level. And I would have no reason to dissociate myself from the mission which the people have assigned to me: namely, to govern alongside of them under any circumstances."

Castellanos Dominguez won the PRI nomination over politicians such as Horacio Castellanos Coutino, former prosecutor of the Federal District and current senator of the republic, and Patrocinio Gonzalez Blanco, an official in the capital, and son of former Labor Secretary Salomon Gonzalez Blanco.

His nomination gave rise to much conjecture. Gustavo Armendariz, secretary of economic development, considered the general's appointment "a great advantage" because "a firmer hand is needed for so much disorder which, unfortunately, exists." The Mexican Democratic Party even went so far as to suggest that the federal government thought of Castellanos because "there are probably guerrillas, or they could appear at any moment." Experts at the University of Chiapas do not consider the military man's nomination incidental or insignificant, in view of the troubled situation in the state.

But the general has responded to all these hypotheses by stating: "Those who think that my government will be harsh are mistaken. The fact that I am a member of the military means only that I am a citizen in the service of the nation."

2909

CSO: 3010/1304

PAN CONCERN OVER IMMIGRATION

Mexico City EL SOL DE MEXICO in Spanish 27 Mar 82 p 17-A

[Article by Efrain Salazar: "PAN Candidate Calls for Mexican Identity Card"]

[Text] Dolores Hidalgo, Guanajuato, 26 March (OEM)--Where, as Pablo Madero had noted, the battle for independence was begun over 171 years ago, he was now calling for the establishment of the citizen's identity card in Mexico, "to prevent the uncontrolled flow of Central Americans which has made it possible for undesirable people to enter Mexican territory."

During the fourth day of his political tour, the PAN [National Action Party] candidate for the presidency of the republic said that, for the sake of human solidarity, "the Mexican border should not be closed," because there are people fleeing from the violence in their places of origin; and retracted from the "implicit support" that he had voiced last Tuesday for the Salvadoran president, Jose Napoleon Duarte.

Annoyed, Madero told reporters that they could write "even about my private life," while asking them not to invent statements. Nevertheless, he said that he approved of the elections in El Salvador and was opposed to the actions of the guerrillas.

As for the migration of Guatemalans and Salvadorans who, he claimed, "are entering Mexico at an average rate of 30,000 per momnth," he warned about the ease with which Mexican territory can be entered by activists, guerrillas and criminals, who could jeopardize the calmness and stability of the states in that border zone.

He claimed that this uncontrolled flow of foreigners has caused the business of forging Mexican birth certificates to "flourish," noting that until the identity card is established it will be impossible to ascertain the number and type of foreigners entering the country.

2909

CSO: 3010/1304

DEFENSE SECRETARY FELIX GALVAN DISCUSSES SECURITY ISSUES

No Guatemalan Troops Encountered

Mexico City PROCESO in Spanish 29 Mar 82 pp 6-9

[Interview with National Defense Secretary Felix Galvan Lopez by Oscar Hinojosa; date and place not given]

[Text] The secretary of national defense, Gen Felix Galvan Lopez, gave the country assurance that the national sovereignty is being kept inviolate on the southern border, despite those who claim the contrary, "who surely do not have more information than I," and even those who cite the possibility of such an incident.

General Galvan told PROCESO: "Not only shall I not allow our fellow countrymen to be mistreated, but I shall not allow Guatemalan troops to enter our territory either. All of us in the Army have that conviction. The commanders of the operation bases and the commanders of military zones are quite well aware that we shall never allow it. The Army will never allow a single armed foreigner to enter the country, regardless of what he may represent and whether he comes from the north, south, east or west."

General Galvan has retained an athletic, martial bearing long after others have lost it to softness and lack of enthusiasm: the mark of a methodical life. This is the source of his sobriety in both speaking and demeanor. It lent the interview which he held with PROCESO for over an hour the friendly tone of an informal conversation.

The reporter concentrated the interview on the claim by the governor of Chiapas, Juan Sabines, to the effect that the Army of Guatemala is mistreating Mexican Indians in the border area; but that topic led to others, from which the following statements by General Galvan resulted:

"The commander and the detail that were extorting a group of Mexicans who had crossed the Usumacinta to sell goods in Guatemalan border towns were removed at the order of that country's defense minister (after a meeting with Galvan himself, in Tapachula).

"The Mexican Army's relations with the Army of Guatemala are the same that exist with all the armies of the countries with which Mexico maintains diplomatic relations.

"The social and labor movements which have arisen in the country during recent years are a result of the freedom granted by the laws of the country and the political reform. They deserve complete respect from the Mexican Army.

"We all have a right to think of what best suits our interests, but we must pay heed to the country's interests in particular. If someone is convinced that socialism is advantageous for Mexico, and it is actually advantageous for Mexico, all well and good. Let him think as a socialist, as a capitalist or whatever.

"The Mexican Army will respect any political regime that comes to govern the country with the people's support. Transcending talk and attitudes, the Armed Forces originate from the people. We are common people.

"There is in preparation the strategy which the Mexican Army will carry out for the purpose of enabling all the citizens 'to vote for whomever they wish' and of preventing any act of violence during the July elections.

"The Army remains 'completely dissociated' from the election campaigns. The groups from the Presidential Staff participating in the campaign of the PRI [Institutional Revolutionary Party] candidate 'have a permit, according to law, for engaging in political activities.'"

At the beginning of the interview, Galvan questioned whether Governor Sabines had made the aforementioned claim. Then he remarked:

"I have been especially careful to have the troops which we have deployed on the Guatemalan border exercise strict vigilance, particularly with respect to the problems confronting that country: the guerrillas. In other words, the Mexican troops must be careful not to let the Guatemalan guerrillas enter our country, and in that contingency they have orders to capture them subdue them and turn them over to the competent authorities.

"At the present time, all units of the 31st Military Zone (which corresponds to the state of Chiapas) are deployed, and they have not encountered Guatemalan groups on Mexican territory; much less have those troops seized Mexican citizens on their own, or detained and mistreated them. The troops under my command have not discovered any such problems."

The head of the National Defense Secretariat then cited a concrete instance of extortion of Mexican groups on the part of Guatemalan troops: In Pipiles, some fellow countrymen had been crossing the Usumacinta River to sell goods and grain in Guatemalan towns and settlements. When they were on the Guatemalan side, the military detail stationed in that location detained them.

"I don't know whether they were tortured; but what I can, indeed, say is that the commander was extorting them, and was sending those who did not turn over

a sum of money back to the Mexican side. Then the Guatemalan defense minister and I met in Tapachula. I explained the problem to him, and he immediately ordered the removal of the complete detail, not merely the commander. Aside from this case, I have had no further information. I believe that the situation has now been resolved."

[Question] Mr Secretary, I am well aware that a publication is not the regular vehicle for communication between officials, but will the claim by Governor Sabines carried in PROCESO serve to prompt the Defense Secretariat to take note of the matter?

[Answer] The claim has not been made to me.

[Question] Mr Secretary, what would the mere possibility that such incidents might occur suggest to you?

[Answer] The Secretariat of Defense made the decision to talk with the Guatemalan authorities because of the fact that a fellow citizen had complained of mistreatment by Guatemalan troops to the Secretariat of Government, a department which transferred the case to me. We confirmed the charge through the commander of the military zone. That is why I expressed our concern to the Guatemalan defense minister.

[Question] Should one infer from this that if the Secretariat of Defense, or its head, heeds the complaint of a private citizen, this would be done with all the more reason if the charge from the governor of Chiapas were formalized?

[Answer] Yes, if the governor of the state formalizes it, of course. I would adopt the appropriate measures, or would appeal to the higher authority (the Secretariat of Government) to have the irregularities committed against our fellow citizens corrected.

[Question] Generally speaking, what are the Mexican Army's relations with the Army of Guatemala like?

[Answer] The relations that exist between the Mexican Army and the Guatemalan Army are the same that exist with all the armies of the countries with which Mexico maintains diplomatic relations. Have I made myself clear?

[Question] Does the Mexican Army (and do you personally) fear that the events in Central America, the wave of revolution, will spread to our country, and specifically to the southeast? And if this is so, would it be a result of what has occurred in Central America or would it be something emerging from the troubled situation that exists in the state of Chiapas?

[Answer] We all know from the news media that there is a troubled situation in Central America; but we also all know that the nations of Central America are friends of Mexico. Mexico has always striven for the welfare of Central America. It has also given aid on various occasions, with food or other products essential to the people of those countries. Therefore, I do not

believe that, if they have their internal conflicts, their guerrillas and their violent confrontations, those problems will affect us, when we are helping them to solve their problems. As you know, the president submitted a peace plan for the purpose of enabling all the nations of Central America to solve their problems, not through violence but rather by dialog. I do not believe that those countries will create problems for a nation which is assisting them.

[Question] General, what is your view of the situation in Chiapas which, in the governor's opinion, combines the problems of El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua?

[Answer] I do not interpret it in that way. I do not believe that the problems of Chiapas are those of any Central American country. That would be tantamount to admitting that violence exists and that there is already an armed group in Chiapas opposed to our government. I do not believe that the governor made that claim. But if he did make it, I believe, with all due respect, that he is mistaken. What Chiapas needs is more attention from the competent authorities.

[Question] Some business sectors have requested a "sealing of the border," a closing of the frontier with Central America. What is your opinion on this matter?

[Answer] I do not agree. We have diplomatic relations with Guatemala. I don't see why we would have to close the borders.

[Question] The next governor of Chiapas (most certainly) will be a politician with a military background. Is Gen Absalon Castellanos Dominguez' designation due to the fact that Chiapas is a troubled area?

[Answer] I do not think so. I find no relationship between the claim that Chiapas is a troubled area and the fact that the next governor may be a military man. Whether the governor is military or civilian, he has no authority to command troops, or to put them in operation. I do not think that the fact that the governor may be a military man has any relationship, or importance.

[Question] Mr Secretary, what was the Army's participation in the incidents at Golonchan? The governor of Chiapas told PROCESO, verbatim: "The state government had no intervention in Golonchan. Actually, there was a confrontation between the people and the Army. But I cannot send it; I should not and have not. The Army is a preeminently federal institution, which is run with complete independence." What is your opinion?

[Answer] In Golonchan, part of the population would not allow the military contingent to spend the night in the town, as it had intended, and there were even shouts from the people. The troops fired into the air, to prevent being attacked, and later withdrew. That was their intervention.

[Question] Based on the report of these incidents submitted to you, what were the results?

[Answer] That is the report which was submitted to me by the commander of the military zone.

[Question] And what about the casualties on either side?

[Answer] There were no casualties on the part of the Army.

[Question] Mr Secretary, if I may return to the incidents claimed by Governor Sabines: If this claim were to be confirmed, and conveyed officially and formally, what position would the Mexican Army assume?

[Answer] As you know, it would not be I who would assume a position against the governor of a free and sovereign state; in any event, it would, rather, be the competent authorities, possibly the Secretariat of Government. This is because the Army has no reason to intervene against a governor, or to set out to apprehend the governor. Of course not. That is not my mission, nor do I have the authority to do so.

[Question] Mr Secretary, forgive the poor wording of the question, but I was referring to the claim made by Governor Sabines to the effect that Mexican Indians were mistreated in the border zone. In the event that the mistreatment of the Indians were to be confirmed, in the event that there were to be official confirmation that the national sovereignty was violated on the southern border....

[Answer] Those are the opinions of certain persons, but I do not think that they have more information than I do. Not only shall I not allow our fellow countrymen to be mistreated, but I shall not allow Guatemalan troops to enter our territory. I shall never allow it. Furthermore, all of us in the Army have the conviction that such a thing should not occur. The commanders of the operation bases and the commanders of the military zones are quite well aware that we shall never allow it. I protest against the assertion made by certain persons. The Mexican Army will never allow a single armed foreigner to enter the country, regardless of what he may represent and whether he comes from the south, north, east or west.

[Question] In other words, we can be calm; this did not occur?

[Answer] Yes, sir; I assure you that this did not occur. This did not occur. By the way, why do you ask me about the matter of Golonchan? That happened back in 1981....

[Question] General, that issue is part of Sabines' recent statements. I stressed them in order to bring up some questions to you.

[Answer] They have said that there were many deaths. But I ask: who were killed? Where are the dead? And I say that we had no casualties, because they hit a sergeant and two or three privates with clubs like those used by the people from Chamula (a kind of heavy wooden cane); and it was then that they fired into the air and were able to leave the area.

[Question] Furthermore, General, I understand that there are plans to expand the Military Academy....

[Answer] You are probably referring to the National Defense Academy, which is being expanded because all the facilities that it will have are not yet completed. I am referring to the Defense Academy, which is located in Popotla, because the Military Academy (the one which is on the road to Cuernavaca) is only being refurbished and is in the process of maintenance; because it is far larger. And also, incidentally, it costs a lot of money to maintain it. But expansions are not being made.

[Question] With regard to the strengthening of the Mexican Army, I understand that it recently purchased 50 tank cars specifically to guard the oil wells. What are the new purchases?

[Answer] They are not for the oil wells in particular, although they may be used for their protection. They are for the defense of our territory, for national defense. We purchased exactly 52 Panar type vehicles, and some of them already went on parade on 16 September of last year; because they have not all been delivered to us yet. We shall also purchase Pilatus airplanes, which are advanced training planes, as well as 727 airplanes, which are transport planes that will enable us to carry large contingents of troops to any part of the country in the least possible time.

[Question] How many vehicles were purchased, and at what cost?

[Answer] Normally we do not tell how many, for security reasons. But it is very modest equipment that we have purchased, both airplanes and tanks and transport planes. But they all are new, and not scrap as someone around here claimed. They are all new, and of the best quality. And, of course, we are waiting for the supersonic planes which we contracted for with the United States at the beginning of last year. We also expect them to deliver the airplanes which are equipment for a combat squadron to us before September.

[Question] And what about the protection of the natural resources?

[Answer] We have plans to provide protection and safety for the country's vital facilities; plans of all types, for our facilities, whether they be hydroelectric plants, dams, oil producing areas.....

General Galvan interrupted the conversation to answer a telephone call on a special microwave system. While listening, the general gave the reporter the data from a report on the battle against the drug traffic in Nayarit.

Upon resuming the conversation, he explained: "Through this microwave system I am in touch with the 35 chiefs of military zones; and they, in turn, communicate through similar apparatus, with the tactical-administrative units."

[Question] General, the next question is precisely on the drug traffic. During the years of your administration, has the drug traffic increased or declined?

[Answer] Considerably, in fact, considerably. I estimate that 10 percent of what we initially discovered, destroyed or seized may still remain. Whereas, previously, we had 100 plantations (between marihuana and poppies), there are now only 10. It has declined in that proportion.

[Question] Have international drug trafficking rings been discovered, located in Mexico?

[Answer] Not in our territory; furthermore, that is not the Army's function, it is the function of the Attorney General's Office. We work together with the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic; our work is essentially in rural areas, detecting marihuana plantations and capturing drug traffickers. In the urban areas it is the Attorney General's Office which is responsible for such tasks, as well as locating clandestine laboratories used for processing the poppies.

[Question] Mr Secretary, in recent times, during the past few years, a certain amount of revival has been noted in popular, labor and other movements. How does the Mexican Army regard this type of social movement?

[Answer] We believe that they are the result of the freedom which our laws grant and of the political reform.

[Question] Do you have respect for this type of social and popular movement?

[Answer] Yes, I believe that we all have a right to think of what best suits our interests, but we must pay heed to the country's interests in particular. If someone is convinced that socialism is advantageous for Mexico, and it is actually advantageous for Mexico, all well and good. Let him think as a socialist, as a capitalist or whatever. But I do believe that there must be freedom, so that everyone may express his opinion and state his opinion, in accordance with our laws, always in accordance with our laws, and always looking out for the prosperity and happiness of all Mexicans.

[Question] Mr Secretary, would that idea go so far as to indicate that the Mexican Army would respect any political regime that came to govern the country, with the people's support?

[Answer] Of course, of course it does. The Army comes from the people. I myself come from farmers. We are, in fact (it is not a word, a phrase or a attitude), we are in fact common people. The privates are farm boys whom we recruit, and the officers also come from the popular classes. I myself, who am on the highest echelon, come from farmers; and my relatives are common people.

[Question] Mr Secretary, an election campaign is under way which will end with the elections of 4 July. What is the position of the Mexican Army toward this political event?

[Answer] Following a systematic procedure for operating, the first thing we do is to plan how we are going to provide vigilance, security and calmness

for the elections, and how we are going to guarantee the free casting of votes. We are devising our plans for the entire republic, in order to enable all the citizens to vote for whomever they wish, and also to prevent any act of violence during the election process.

[Question] The Mexican Army has an active participation in the process....

[Answer] According to law, we must guarantee the security and calmness of the process.

[Question] And does it remain absolutely dissociated from the election campaigns?

[Answer] Absolutely dissociated from the election campaign.

[Question] I would ask you why certain political parties have complained that the candidate of the Institutional Revolutionary Party has been aided by groups from the Military Staff.

[Answer] That is so, but they are groups which have a permit, according to law, to participate in fair elections.

[Question] In other words, they are not on active duty nor do they use Army facilities?

[Answer] No, they do not use them....you can observe it. They are military, but just as you are in the service of a news organ, but can request a permit to go there, the military who are traveling with the candidate De la Madrid have a permit to perform that function.

[Question] A specific permit to perform that...."

[Answer] A permit to engage in political activities. Our law so stipulates.

[Question] But were they not assigned?

[Answer] No, De la Madrid knew them, or at least some of them. He invited Bermudez, owing to its status as deputy chief of the Presidential Staff. He went, and later requested his permit. He called upon some other colleagues, who in turn requested a permit and are there. So, there is no problem. We have no problem nor do they, because they are protected by the law.

Denial on Guerrillas

Mexico City PROCESO in Spanish 29 Mar 82 pp 8-9

[Text] There are no training camps for Guatemalan guerrillas in the country, nor have there been any; Mexican troops stationed in the southeast constantly search the areas where "according to some rumors, including some in the press,

such camps exist." So stated General Galvan, while with a pointer in his hand he gave the reporter a description of the marks and drawings on a special map of the southern border zone.

He said that he had even "invited a group of Guatemalan officers to the military maneuvers last year, to make a tour with me of all the areas in which it was claimed that there were guerrilla training camps. They, numbering about 14 or 15 officers, got out of their helicopters at the locations which they themselves had selected, to give greater evidence that there were no such camps. We even penetrated the jungle in search of the much-discussed training camps; even this far (he pointed to the dense jungle), but there were none."

At the conclusion of the interview, the defense secretary invited the reporter to go to the Map Room, so as "to explain to you how we are protecting our southern border; so that you will obtain an idea, albeit a brief one, of the precautions that we have taken to prevent, insofar as possible, the infiltrations of Guatemalans mentioned often by the press."

Surprised by the unannounced visit, the officers and chiefs working in the offices located between the defense secretary's office and the Map Room quickly made way for their superior, stood at attention in front of him, stepped forward to open the next door, or asked him whether he required their services.

Facing one of several maps in the room (to which one cannot have access without special permission), the general explained that the Mexican Army has details and a base of operations in the entire Usumacinta region. Also, it has a cavalry regiment in Comitán which sends patrols and contingents to the Guatemalan border, especially to the Montebello Lagoon, where there is a great deal of traffic to Guatemala.

Galvan said: "We also have units in Motozintla, Unión Juárez, Talisman and Ciudad Hidalgo, which constantly tour the basin. In addition, the Army has helicopters in the 24th cavalry battalion, which aids the vehicles making those tours."

The defense secretary also explained that, last July, at three different points on the border, there was a mass immigration of Guatemalans (approximately 3,000 persons), who stationed themselves along the Usumacinta River, because it is simply impossible to penetrate beyond 50 meters in those locations.

"Imagine what a coincidence: At three different points, on the same day, groups which in all totaled about 3,000 persons entered. That is why I say that they have been somewhat manipulated," declared Galvan, recalling that he personally had toured the entire region and chatted with several of the immigrants. From conversations with the latter, General Galvan reached the conclusion that a considerable number of the immigrants had been manipulated.

Galvan remarked: "At the request of the Mexican authorities, they returned to their country without any problem."

[Question] General, who do you think could be manipulating those groups?

[Answer] Vargas should find out about that.

2909

CSO: 3010/1304

PEOPLE URGED TO MAINTAIN CURRENT VIGILANCE

PA132015 Managua Domestic Service in Spanish 0000 GMT 13 Apr 82

[Station commentary: "Vigilance Is Not Over; It Continues"]

[Text] Now that the work of holy week and the commitment to vigilance, as well as the pleasant hours of recreation on Friday, Saturday and Sunday, have been left behind, forming an unforgettable part of our lives in this summer of tension and of hope, it would be proper for us to renew our tasks this Easter week, bearing in mind that we continue to be in a state of emergency, committed to production and defense.

After properly fulfilling our duty during holy week, working uninterruptedly in both urban and rural areas with the hammer and the plow, which are the tools of peace and of the revolution, it would be well that we not forget that the imperialist threats are always present, day and night. The cunning enemy never sleeps; instead, it continues to plot sabotage, attacks and death against the people's power.

The aggressive nature of imperialism cannot be forgotten at any time, especially as we know that its open or secret agents, our enemies, unceasingly move about inside and outside our country in constant counterrevolutionary activity; seeking a break in our defense in order to carry out their crimes with impunity.

The counterrevolutionary terrorist plans of the CIA and its agents did not seek to surprise us only during holy week; they will continue for an indeterminate time, at least until Mr Reagan's government promises, with both words and deeds, to dismantle all of the structures established by the counterrevolutionary conspiracy in the United States, Honduras and other countries.

In this regard, it is proper to point out that if some of its plans against our country have not been implemented thus far, particularly in the past few days, it is not because the attacks were merely Sandinist rumors, as our enemies say; rather, it is for the simple and overwhelming reason that the 24-hour-a-day vigilance of the Nicaraguan people rendered our defenses impenetrable to the counterrevolutionaries.

The vigilance at bridges, factories, roads, highways, stores and cooperatives clearly cut off the sinister hand of the agents who would have perpetrated the interventionist crime, preventing them from carrying out their plans of destabilization. The effectiveness of our vigilance has been clearly demonstrated. The numerous eyes of the alert working masses presented the enemy with an unsurmountable wall, which, despite everything, it will try to jump if we give it the opportunity. We must defeat the enemy on the productive front and on the defensive front. If we do not, our reply will lack the tremendous strength needed to defeat imperialism and to open the way to the achievement of the revolutionary plan.

The same strength and fearlessness that has been demonstrated in the days since the state of emergency was decreed--and which were intensified during holy week--should be maintained in the coming weeks, to show imperialism and its puppets that we have solidly strengthened ourselves and that if they reject the path of peaceful negotiation and choose armed confrontation, they will once again meet the firm determination of a people who have sworn to kneel only before the flag of the fatherland and the sacred remains of their martyrs.

Let us resume our current tasks with the energy and determination necessary to keep our nation's sovereignty safe, the colors of the fatherland's flag free of stain and to prevent intervention. International solidarity with our cause and our constant, arduous and experienced vigilance will guarantee that this will be so, regardless of all of the dangers.

CSO: 3010/1330

FAS TO ATTEND AIR FORCE MEETING IN ARGENTINA

PA130329 Managua Domestic Service in Spanish 0000 GMT 13 Apr 82

[Text] Nicaragua has been invited to a meeting of chiefs of hemispheric armed forces [as heard] in Argentina. The chief of the Sandinist Air Force, FAS Commander Raul Venerio, heads the delegation that our revolutionary government has sent to the 22d meeting of American air force chiefs, which opens tomorrow in Argentina.

Our presence at that meeting implies an opening from the political standpoint within the framework of the search for detente and the expansion of relations among the various hemispheric air forces, Commander Venerio said before leaving for Argentina.

He explained that only the technical aspects of inter-American aviation are discussed at this type of meeting. These aspects include the regulation of flight systems [reglamentacion de sistemas de vuelo], operations and rescue services in the case of air disasters, protocols and public relations.

According to Commander Venerio, the agenda for the Buenos Aires meeting includes several very important technical topics that will greatly benefit the Sandinists' incipient military aviation.

The Argentine military aviation chief, Brig Basilio Lami Dozo, will preside over the meeting. U.S. Gen (John Mcenery), chief of the Inter-American Defense Board, who has been in Nicaragua, will also participate in the meeting.

CSO: 3010/1330

BRIEFS

BATTALION RETURNS--Jinotega, Nicaragua--Vanguard Battalion 60-11 was welcomed magnificently on its return from Zelaya Norte, where it has been defending the fatherland's interests since 1 January 1982. Placards, flags, flowers and confetti were everywhere as the caravan of vehicles passed through the streets. A huge ceremony was held afterward to mark the reservists' return. Speeches were delivered, certificates were distributed and the reservists' performance was praised. [PA131830 Managua Domestic Service in Spanish 0000 GMT 13 Apr 82]

BATTALIONS IN TRAINING--A political rally was held at the local stadium in Santo Tomas Chontales to greet Battalion 90-11, which returned to town last night after a long period of military training. Meanwhile, in Rivas, Battalion 80-12 entered Belen triumphantly following its return from somewhere in Nicaragua and Battalion 80-18 left Tola to continue its combat preparation in a second period of military training. In addition, the 26 February Plaza was the scene of the farewell that Diriamba residents gave to Battalion Ricardo Vargas 58-20 on 7 April. Infantry Battalion 80-15 returned to Masaya on 6 April after carrying out its third mission "somewhere in Nicaragua" in the defense of the Sandinist peoples revolution. In Granada, the members of Reserve Battalion 19-31 left for somewhere in Nicaragua. [PA131221 Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 8 Apr 82 p 4]

GOVERNMENT WILLING TO TALK TO U.S.--Nicaraguan Ambassador to Mexico Aldo Diaz Lacayo has said in Mexico City that the Nicaraguan Government is willing to negotiate with the United States anywhere and at any time with the presence of the Mexican Government as a witness of honor so that it will guarantee that the talks will have positive results. Diaz Lacayo noted that Nicaragua's experience in direct talks with the United States has been bitter since each time such talks have been held privately, the U.S. Government has released exactly the opposite of what has been said. [Text] [PA091443 Managua Domestic Service in Spanish 0600 GMT 9 Apr 82]

BATTALION ACTIVITIES--Managua Reserve Battalion 56-18 issued a communique yesterday urging all its members to report to the unit urgently. The communique adds that its members must be at combat readiness at all times. [PA121350 Managua EL NUEVO DIARIO in Spanish 5 Apr 82 p 1] Ometepe Island, Rivas--The best children of Ometepe, who joined Reserve Battalion 25-52, left for somewhere in Nicaragua to defend the country's sovereignty. Meanwhile, in Masaya, Battalion 80-15, made up of Monimbo combatants,

also left for somewhere in Nicaragua to defend our fatherland. [Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 27 Mar 82 p 8] Rivas Battalion 80-12 has left for some mountain region in Nicaragua to consolidate the combat experience assimilated during the first military preparation course. Training is being directed by the Sandinist People's Army. [Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 4 Apr 82 p 4]

MEETING WITH U.S. ENVOY--The Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Nicaragua reports that on 8 April 1982 it received Mr Anthony Quainton, U.S. ambassador, with whom a conversation was held on the relations between the Nicaraguan and U.S. Government and on the overall situation of the Central American region. The Nicaraguan Government views this visit of the U.S. ambassador as a positive gesture which can contribute to the negotiations that the U.S. Government proposed through the Mexican Government and which inexplicably have not been held. Nicaragua considers that the context of those negotiations must include the proposal made by Commander Daniel Ortega before the UN Security Council on 25 March which in turn takes into account the overall proposal made by Mexican President Jose Lopez Portillo in Managua on 21 February 1982. Managua, 8 April 1982, year of unity in face of aggression. [Text] [Communique issued by the Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry in Managua on 8 April--read by announcer] [Text] [PA091428 Managua Domestic Service in Spanish 0600 GMT 9 Apr 82]

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